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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional rights do not exist in splendid isolation, hermetically
sealed off from one another. To the contrary, many constitutional rights
are actively relational.1 They intersect, associate, converse, and conflict
with one another, in an ongoing and dynamic process of adjudication,
scholarly examination, and public discourse.2 These dynamic intersections
affect constitutional remedies in individual cases.3 More broadly, they influence interpretations of individual constitutional rights and understandings of constitutional liberty.
For example, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and
Equal Protection Clause have frequently intersected with one another, in
ways that have illuminated the meaning of both clauses and created distinctive rights.4 In Obergefell v. Hodges,5 which recognized a constitutional right to
marriage equality, the Supreme Court located the right in both the due process and equal protection guarantees. The Court observed that these provisions are “connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent
principles,” and observed that the relationship between these provisions “furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.”6 As Laurence Tribe has observed, the Court “tightly wound the double helix of Due
Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity.”7 It excavated
1

2

3
4

5
6
7

See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2016)
(arguing that the “democratic rights protected by the First Amendment are not independent
points, but rather are deeply interrelated and overlapping”).
See Timothy Zick, Rights Speech, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2014) (observing that freedom of speech
intersects with a number of constitutional rights, including abortion and Second Amendment
rights); Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (2016) (examining judicial analysis where more than one constitutional rights provision is invoked); Kerry
Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming
2017) (arguing that constitutional rights frequently intersect and combine in ways that inform
constitutional remedies).
See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1077 (focusing on how combinations of constitutional clauses affect
dispositions of cases); Abrams & Garrett, supra note 2 (focusing on remedial concerns).
See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33
MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) (observing that “the ideas of equality and liberty expressed
in the equal protection and due process clauses each emerge from and reinforce the other”).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2586, 2603 (2015).
Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 16, 17 (2015)
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and relied upon decades of dynamic intersection between the two clauses.8
As Obergefell shows, constitutional rights are not isolated textual blots.
They often relate to, and inform, one another through a process of dynamic
interaction that places them in proximity to one another. Current understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause are the
product, in part, of its intersection with (among other provisions) the Due
Process Clause.9 Similarly, as anyone who has taught or taken a First
Amendment course knows, we cannot truly understand the contemporary
Free Speech Clause without considering its relationship to the Equal Protection Clause.10 So, too, modern understandings of the Free Exercise
Clause and Establishment Clause only make sense when we consider their
dynamic intersection with the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.
What is more, all of these relationships are bi-or multi-directional in the
sense that the influences and effects run in more than one direction. In
sum, in order to fully appreciate and understand constitutional rights, we
must generally look in more than one direction.
This Article identifies and analyzes the dynamic process in which constitutional rights intersect and interact with one another. It refers to this
process as “Rights Dynamism.”11 Rights Dynamism is related to, but distinct from, several existing theoretical and interpretive traditions. The first
is intratextualism, which posits that constitutional meaning is a product of
the connections between and among words and phrases in the Constitution.12 A second tradition is the common law interpretive method, which
generally shows how constitutional meaning changes or evolves primarily as
a result of case-by-case adjudication.13 Rights Dynamism also shares some

8
9
10

11

12
13

(emphasis omitted).
See Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 148–51
(2015) (describing the doctrinal journey that led to Obergefell).
See Karlan, supra note 4, at 474 (observing that “the ideas of equality and liberty expressed in the
equal protection and due process clauses each emerge from and reinforce the other”).
See Timothy Zick, The Dynamic Relationship between Freedom of Expression and Equal Protection, 12 DUKE
J. LAW & PUB. POL. 13 (2016) (examining in detail the relationship between First Amendment expressive rights and Fourteenth Amendment equality rights).
My conception of Rights Dynamism differs from, but shares some major premises with, Professor
Jack Balkin’s conception. Balkin defines “rights dynamism” as “the claim that the nature, scope,
and boundaries of rights, and in particular fundamental rights like speech, are continually shifting
with historical, political, economic, and technological changes in the world.” Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 55 (2004). Balkin’s conception of rights dynamism is broader than my own, which focuses in particular on relationships between rights. But those relationships are, as Balkin suggests,
contingent and continually subject to change—in part owing to historical, political, and other influences. Thus, while we share a major premise, my conception of Rights Dynamism focuses
primarily on the active intersection of rights and rights provisions. My central claim is that one of
the things that significantly influences the meanings of rights provisions is their relationship to
other rights provisions.
See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
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conceptual space with living originalism, which respects historical meanings
but also teaches that changes in constitutional meaning are part of a dynamic, evolutionary, and public process.14 Finally, Rights Dynamism
draws upon insights from the study of social movements and civic institutions, which have been critically important to constitutional change.15
Like intra-textualism, Rights Dynamism is distinctly and consciously relational. It focuses on and elaborates associations between and among different constitutional provisions. In some respects, Rights Dynamism’s
elaborative process resembles the common law tradition. For example, it
focuses primarily on judicial construction of individual rights through caseby-case adjudication.16 Like living originalism, Rights Dynamism acknowledges and accounts for historical intersections and meanings.17 It also
adopts the perspective that changes in constitutional meaning are part of a
dynamic, evolutionary, and ongoing process that involves many different
actors and influences—legislators, courts, litigants, civic institutions, and of
course the people.18
Although it shares ideas and concepts with these approaches, Rights
Dynamism is distinctive. It is not an abstract theory, or a method of constitutional interpretation that purports to resolve constitutional ambiguities.
Nor does Rights Dynamism apply the specific methods or conclusions of
any existing interpretive tradition, including those mentioned. Rather, it
focuses on the real-world actions and forces that bring rights together and
contribute over time to elaborations of their various meanings. Thus,
Rights Dynamism is much closer to the ground than high—or even low—
constitutional theory. As I explain, it is a messy, disorderly, and sometimes
seemingly illogical process of constitutional interaction and elaboration.
Constitutional scholars have long taken note of certain links or connections between individual constitutional rights.19 However, they have not
14
15

16
17

18
19

See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 200–01 (2011).
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Jurisgenerative Role of Social Movements in United States Constitutional Law, at
11 (for publication with the papers of the Seminario en Latino América de Teoria Constitucional
y
Politica
(SELA),
June
10-12,
2004,
Oaxaca,
México)
available
at
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Faculty/Siegel_Jurisgenerative_Role_of_Soci
al_Movements.pdf; Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto Era, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006). See also DAVID COLE, ENGINES
OF LIBERTY (2016) (examining the important role of civic institutions in the process of constitutional change).
See STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 36 (describing the common law as a system “in which precedents
evolve, shaped by notions of fairness and good policy”).
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 235
(1998) (observing that Reconstruction Republicans frequently mentioned and invoked expressive
rights in debates concerning equality).
See BALKIN, supra note 14, at 3 (“In each generation the American people are charged with the
obligation to flesh out and implement text and principle in their own time.”).
See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965) (examining the
relationship between expressive rights and racial equality).
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systematically connected the relational dots. In particular, scholars have
neither identified nor explained the wide-ranging process in which rights
intersect and associate with one another over time. Rights Dynamism is a
step in the direction of addressing this shortcoming.
As legal constructs, most constitutional rights share deep historical connections. Some even intersected during pre-ratification and ratification
eras. However, the primary focus in this Article will be the modern era of
constitutional adjudication—roughly the middle of the twentieth century to
the present. During that era, rights first began to intersect on a frequent
basis. This occurred as a result of the actions and strategic choices of litigants, social movements, and other actors who presented a wide variety of
cumulative, alternative, aggregate, and hybrid rights claims in constitutional cases.20 They sometimes strategically invoked particular constitutional
rights, such as freedom of speech, in order to facilitate recognition of equal
protection and other rights.21 As a result of these actions, courts were called
upon to adjudicate and interpret at the intersections of constitutional rights.
They had to make choices concerning which, if any, alternative constitutional rights claims to recognize or uphold. In the process of doing so,
courts elaborated not just individual rights and remedies, but also the relationship between and sometimes among different constitutional rights.
Although it takes place most regularly and principally in the courts,
Rights Dynamism also includes non-judicial actors and non-legal influences.
Thus, governments have enacted laws and policies that have placed constitutional rights in connection or tension with one another. Scholars have developed theories concerning rights, and sometimes published commentaries
on the relationships between and among different rights. The press reports
on rights, and the public consumes information about and debates the contours of rights. These external forces are a less visible but still vital aspect of
Rights Dynamism. They too can influence or alter the meanings of constitutional rights as they intersect with and relate to one another.
Part I of the Article introduces and explains the concept of Rights Dynamism. It examines the relational character of constitutional rights, and
explains the various ways in which rights provisions can come to intersect
with one another. Part I then turns to the mechanics of Rights Dynamism.
In very broad terms, it identifies the influences that can affect when and
how rights intersect, and explains how these intersections lead to bidirectional constitutional elaborations over time.
Part II examines Rights Dynamism in practice, through three detailed
examples. It focuses on three different rights relationships: (1) equal protec20
21

Abrams & Garrett, supra note 2 at 14.
See generally KALVEN, supra note 19 (describing civil rights advocates’ strategic reliance on First
Amendment claims).
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tion and due process; (2) freedom of expression and equal protection; and (3)
freedom of expression and free exercise of religion. 22 These constitutional
relationships have spanned many decades and eras. Thus, it is not possible
to identify and discuss all of the details and nuances of their intersections.
The more limited object in Part II is to provide a general sense of how
Rights Dynamism works, and how bi-directional elaboration results from
the dynamic intersection between and sometimes among rights provisions.
Part III explores the implications of Rights Dynamism for rights, rightsholders, and the study of rights. It offers a critical assessment of Rights Dynamism, based on the relationships examined in Part II. The assessment
makes three general points. First, we ought to reconsider our perspective
regarding “individual” rights. Many constitutional rights are actively relational—they ought to be conceptualized, taught, studied, and discussed as
relational constructs, rather than as isolated individual protections.23 Second, notwithstanding their relational character, it is important to maintain
some conceptual and enforcement space between constitutional rights provisions. This separation helps to prevent rights subjugation (the dominance
of one right by another) and rights redundancy (the treatment of constitutional text as redundant or meaningless). Third, and relatedly, we ought to
work toward the goal of having a healthy and collaborative rights pluralism.
As Obergefell and other examples show, constitutional rights are infinitely
stronger and more liberty-enhancing when they can be invoked and engaged in collaborative and synergistic relationships. Part III concludes by
identifying some additional rights relationships whose examination could
further our understanding of Rights Dynamism and its relationship to constitutional construction.
I. RIGHTS RELATIONSHIPS AND RIGHTS DYNAMICS
This Part introduces and explains the concept of Rights Dynamism. It
begins by highlighting the relational nature of constitutional rights. The
Part then describes and explains the general process of Rights Dynamism,

22

23

References in the Article to “expressive” rights generally include not only freedom of speech but
also related rights including freedom of association and freedom of press. The terminology reflects the Supreme Court’s treatment of these and other First Amendment rights as related to, ancillary to, or subsumed by the Free Speech Clause. Some scholars have been highly critical of this
interpretation. See, e.g., JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF
ASSEMBLY (2012); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE:
SEDITIOUS LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION GOVERNMENT FOR
A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES (2012); Sonja R. West, First Amendment Neighbors, 66 ALA. L. REV.
357 (2014). The Article’s usage reflects the Court’s current characterization of the constellation of
First Amendment rights that are related to or protect “expression.”
See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1072 (claiming that as a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court has
often combined constitutional clauses—including rights provisions—in order to dispose of cases).
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and its relationship to constitutional interpretation.
A. Rights as Relational
Constitutional rights are individual rights, in the fundamental sense that
they belong to individual persons and protect personal interests.24 However, constitutional rights do not exist in strict isolation from one another. To
the contrary, they are connected by thick historical, precedential, and doctrinal tissues.25 From inception to maturity, rights relate, associate, and intersect in a variety of interesting and dynamic ways. Their relationships
profoundly shape and influence our understandings of individual rights and
constitutional liberty more generally.
First, constitutional rights are connected by virtue of their common origins and shared histories. The rights in the Bill of Rights were subject to
debate, adoption, and ratification through the same democratic processes—
the “original” Rights Dynamism, one might say. Proponents of subsequent
amendments relied on some of these original guarantees to gain recognition
for new rights. For example, with regard to constitutional equality, Reconstruction Republicans vigorously resisted restrictions on freedom of speech
and freedom of press that they knew would interfere with the recognition
and exercise of racial equality rights.26 The Fourteenth Amendment was
later invoked to “incorporate” almost all of the Bill of Rights against states
and localities.27 In these and other respects, rights provisions have been
closely and indelibly connected from inception.
Second, although individual rights are freestanding provisions, they also
overlap in terms of their substantive protections. This is true, for example,
of all of the First Amendment’s expressive guarantees—freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, the right to peaceable assembly, the right to petition
government for redress of grievances, and the right of association.28 Freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion are distinctive rights, but
they share a common core that protects freedom of conscience, belief, and
expression.29 Fourteenth Amendment due process and equality rights both
24
25

26
27
28
29

See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995) (describing equal protection as a “personal” right).
See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 14, at 237 (explaining how subsequent amendments relating to the
right to vote, including the Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments, “interact
with” the Fifteenth Amendment).
See AMAR, supra note 17, at 235 (observing that Reconstruction Republicans frequently mentioned
and invoked expressive rights in debates).
See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating that the Free Speech Clause was
part of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
See Bhagwat, supra note 1 (observing that expressive rights are connected by a common concern
with democratic participation).
Cf. William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L.
REV. 545 (1983).
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protect against the threat of caste legislation.30 Fourth Amendment and
First Amendment rights protect a zone of privacy that limits governmental
intrusions into certain intimate matters.31 Partly as a result of their shared
cores, rights provisions can frame, facilitate, and illuminate one another.
Third, in terms of application and enforcement, constitutional rights
have been brought into close and dynamic contact with one another. Once
most of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights had been incorporated against
the states, litigants, activists, and social movements increasingly relied on
these provisions to remedy constitutional wrongs. Since their meanings
were not firmly established, litigants frequently invoked multiple constitutional guarantees in search of a constitutional remedy. These cumulative
and aggregated claims pushed different constitutional rights into direct contact with one another.32
Thus, for example, during the 1930s and 1940s, Jehovah’s Witnesses
who challenged restrictions on public proselytizing and solicitation invoked
the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Free Press
Clause.33 In early challenges to social and economic regulations, litigants
frequently relied on both Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due
process claims.34 Similarly, for many decades, speakers challenging restrictions on expressive activity have relied on both the Equal Protection
Clause and the Free Speech Clause.35 Criminal defendants also began to
accumulate or aggregate due process and Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims, in search of an effective remedy.36 In some of
these cases, the Supreme Court expressly relied on more than one constitutional right to reach its decision. In others, the Court’s treatment of one
rights provision indirectly affected others. In all of these instances, the
Court was part of an ongoing process that helped to establish and define
relationships between and among rights.
Fourth, constitutional claimants have sometimes invoked one individual
right to gain recognition for, or to facilitate the effective exercise of, another
30
31
32
33

34
35
36

See BALKIN, supra note 14, at 222 (explaining that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was
originally intended to prohibit caste legislation).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (articulating a “penumbral” approach to
privacy that relied on a number of different individual rights, including First Amendment rights).
See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1078–82 (discussing some examples of rights combinations in Supreme Court cases).
See generally Daniel Hildebrand, Free Speech and Constitutional Transformation, 10 CONST. COMMENT.
133 (1993) (examining the Hughes Court decisions of the 1930s and 1940s, which elaborated on
free speech, free press, and free exercise rights).
See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (raising both due process and
equal protection challenges to municipal ordinance that restricted commercial advertising).
See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972) (invalidating restriction on
picketing near schools under Equal Protection Clause).
See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 2 (observing that due process and right to legal counsel provisions can operate in this way).
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right. The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause has served this function
with regard to a number of constitutional rights, including equal protection
and free exercise of religion.37 Similarly, Second Amendment proponents
have invoked privacy rights to secure the right to bear arms.38 In these contexts, a right can be used instrumentally to contribute to the recognition or
enforcement of some other right.
Fifth, through laws, regulations, and official expression, government actors sometimes bring different rights provisions into contact with one another. For example, a legislature might regulate the speech of physicians in
order to protect patients’ Second Amendment rights.39 Or it might seek to
influence the exercise of abortion rights by requiring that physicians disclose certain information to women who seek abortions.40 These and other
regulations of “rights speech”—communications about or concerning the
recognition, scope, or exercise of constitutional rights—bring different constitutional rights into contact with one another.41
Sixth, two or more rights-holders may bring constitutional rights into direct or indirect conflict with one another. For example, free speech rights
may conflict with privacy rights or voting rights.42 The Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial might conflict with First Amendment free press rights.43
Rights conflicts can also arise when parties invoke constitutional rights in a
defensive or exclusionary manner. For example, judicial enforcement of
First Amendment freedom of association or free exercise rights can negatively affect constitutional equality rights.44 In these instances, courts sometimes
weigh or balance two conflicting constitutional rights against one another.45
37
38
39

40
41
42

43

44

45

See, e.g., KALVEN, supra note 19 (discussing the use of free speech claims to advance the civil rights
equality agenda).
See Zick, supra note 2, at 27–28 (discussing Second Amendment privacy claims).
See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding provision
prohibiting physicians from asking patients about firearms ownership unless medically appropriate).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding compelled abortion disclosure provision).
See Zick, supra note 2, at 41–55 (discussing the constitutional implications of rights speech regulations).
See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (holding that privacy interest in contents of
private conversation gave way to public interest in dissemination of information of public concern); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840–42 (1995) (holding
provision of student funds to Christian publication did not violate Establishment Clause); Burson
v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding limits on campaign speech
near polls).
See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1976) (noting that free press and fair trial
rights sometimes clash, and that press has an obligation to safeguard the fairness of trial proceedings).
See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (invalidating anti-discrimination
provision as applied to group that rejected homosexual members as part of its expressive message).
See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. CHI.
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Thus far, we have been considering rights primarily in pairings or dyads.
However, sometimes more than two constitutional rights provisions actively
intersect. Thus, as noted, during the 1930s and 1940s, Jehovah’s Witnesses
invoked the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Free
Press Clause to challenge restrictions on public activities. In some contexts,
freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, and the Establishment Clause
may also be implicated by the same set of facts.46 Thus, rights relationships
may involve intersections among more than two constitutional provisions.
In terms of history, substance, and application, many constitutional
rights provisions have intersected and matured together in the various ways
just suggested. As the Supreme Court recently recognized, these kinds of
intersections continue to inform the recognition, enforcement, and interpretation of constitutional rights.
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court held that the right to marriage equality
implicates both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause.47 It
explained that the two clauses are “connected in a profound way, though they
set forth independent principles.”48 The Court elaborated on the relationship:
In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of
the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two
Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right. This
interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.49

The Court’s observations apply to many individual guarantees. Freedom of speech and equal protection provide overlapping but distinctive
coverage for expressive activities. For decades, courts relied on the Equal
Protection Clause to invalidate content-discriminatory laws and regulations.50 Free speech and equal protection “converge” and interrelate in a
way that illuminates both the individual rights and their relationship.
Freedom of speech and (substantive) due process provide overlapping
protection for individual thoughts, and a zone of freedom of intimate and
expressive activities.51 In any particular case, the privacy right or free
speech right may best capture the “essence of the right.” However, the interrelation of the two “furthers our understanding of what freedom is and

46

47
48
49
50
51

ROUNDTABLE 223 (1996) (discussing rights balancing).
See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840 (invalidating exclusion of religious publication from student
activity funding program, and rejecting claim that inclusion of publication would violate the Establishment Clause).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015).
Id. at 2603.
Id. (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972) (invalidating restriction on
picketing near schools under Equal Protection Clause).
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct.”).
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must become.” Another way of articulating the connection is to say that
expressive rights, in particular freedom of speech, are essential to a fully realized right to privacy. At the same time, privacy rights protect important
interests that facilitate and elaborate free speech rights. For example, they
protect an “intellectual privacy” that prohibits government from interfering
with the private accumulation of knowledge.52
As discussed further in Part II, the Free Speech Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause interact in a similar manner.53 In many contexts, either
right might be implicated by governmental action. For instance, religious
expression and religious practices may both be covered by either provision.54 In some contexts, these two clauses may “converge” with regard to
the identification and definition of the right in question. However, this intersection of rights can provide a better and fuller understanding “of what
freedom is and must become.”
In sum, constitutional rights intersect frequently, and in many different
ways. Although not every constitutional right is actively relational in this
sense, many fundamental rights are. At the very least, most rights provisions share a common history. Many overlap in terms of their core coverages. As well, rights often facilitate and illuminate one another—they influence each other’s recognition, scope, and enforcement. Constitutional
rights can also combine, conjoin, and conflict. Far from being isolated
guarantees, rights are part of a system of dynamic and ongoing intersection
and elaboration. That system is reflected in, but not confined to, constitutional adjudication and rights doctrines. As I explain below, Rights Dynamism is a multi-facted and multi-actor enterprise.
B. Rights Dynamics
The right to marriage equality recognized in Obergefell v. Hodges did not
arise overnight. In fact, the equal protection-due process right is the product of decades of interactions—in courts, scholarship, and public debate—
concerning the relationship between equal protection and due process as
they relate to marriage.55
The process in which constitutional rights intersect and relate to one
another has not received adequate scholarly or judicial attention.56 This
52
53
54

55
56

See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 73–74 (2015).
See infra Part II.C.
See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (involving a
free speech and free exercise challenge to a rule that restricted the practice of Sankirtan, a form of
religious proselytizing).
See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 8 (discussing the jurisprudential journey relating to the right to marriage equality).
This is beginning to change. See, e.g., Abrams & Garrett, supra note 2; Coenen, supra note 2.

802

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:4

Section outlines the process in general terms. Part II examines the process
as it relates to three exemplary rights relationships. I refer to the general
process of intersection as “Rights Dynamism.”
As explained earlier, Rights Dynamism shares some conceptual space
with certain existing methods of constitutional adjudication and interpretation—in particular, intratextualism, common law constitutional interpretation, and living originalism.57 Studies of social and constitutional movements are also relevant to the process by which rights intersect with one
another.58 In general, these approaches or schools of thought acknowledge
the relational and evolutionary character of constitutional rights. Together,
they provide a theoretical backbone for Rights Dynamism.
However, Rights Dynamism is distinctive from these theories and traditions, as well as from the study of social and constitutional movements.
Thus, Rights Dynamism is not a means of interpreting the Constitution, or
a framework for interpreting its text in some holistic fashion. Rather,
Rights Dynamism focuses on the relational dynamics between and sometimes among constitutional rights provisions. It highlights and examines a
distinct, active, dynamic process in which the meanings of rights are elaborated over time. Lawyers, activists, judges, reporters, civic institutions, and
constitutional movements are all part of this process.
As suggested earlier, all rights relationships, have an origination point—a
time, we might say, when the provisions were formally “introduced” to one
another for the first time. As I have already noted, we can trace the beginning
of a rights relationship or association back to the origins of individual guarantees. Indeed, even pre-ratification events and influences can be part of the dynamic process by which rights intersect with one another. For instance, the
relationship between free exercise of religion and freedom of speech began
well before the First Amendment was proposed or ratified.59 Similarly, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and due process provisions can
both be traced to a pre-ratification concern with the evils of caste legislation.60
Rights Dynamism does not exclude or ignore the original or historic aspects of the relational process. Indeed, early interactions in debates and
other contexts inform our understanding of intersecting individual rights
and the process of intersection. Historical interactions are an important

57
58
59
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See sources cited supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
See sources cited supra note 14.
See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 16 (2000)
(noting the connection between early struggles to publish religious tracts and freedom of the
press); John H. Yoder, Response of an Amateur Historian and a Religious Citizen, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 415,
416–7 (1989) (“There was a long British Puritan history, from the age of Milton to the 1689 Bill of
Rights, in the course of which the civil freedoms of speech, press, and assembly arose out of religious agitation, not the other way round.”).
See BALKIN, supra note 14, at 222.
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part of the dynamic process in which rights are recognized, defined, and
ultimately enforced. However, although it includes historical interactions
and original influences, Rights Dynamism is primarily concerned with interactions that post-date the ratification of individual rights provisions—
and, indeed, with their dynamic intersection in the past six decades or so.
There are two primary reasons for this focus. First, the process of recognizing, defining, and actually applying provisions in the Bill of Rights did
not begin in earnest until after—in some cases, well after—formal ratification.61 As a result, most of the “action” in Rights Dynamism has occurred
during the modern era.62 Second, one of the primary goals for the study of
Rights Dynamism is to better understand how contemporary understandings
of constitutional rights are influenced by relational concerns. These modern influences are informed by historical materials and events. However,
evolutionary and common law interpretation have been more important to
contemporary understandings of constitutional rights such as freedom of
speech, equal protection, and the free exercise of religion.63 In sum, the
process in which rights intersect involves myriad influences that include but
extend well beyond original materials and understandings.64
In the most general terms, Rights Dynamism begins when government
action implicates more than a single constitutional right. In response and in
search of effective relief, activists and litigants invoke multiple rights provisions. Activists and litigants repeatedly make strategic choices to couple, accumulate, or aggregate rights claims. These decisions, which are themselves
influenced by a variety of social, political, and legal factors, initiate a dynamic relationship between and sometimes among constitutional rights. Cumulative, aggregative, and other constitutional claims connect rights provisions
to and with one another. They initiate the process in which rights interact
and by which their meanings will be debated and constructed.
This process, which occurs over the course of many decades, is active,
iterative, and perpetual. Activists and litigants, many of them repeat players, rely on precedents established by their predecessors. For example, African-Americans benefitted from very early free speech precedents obtained
by Jehovah’s Witnesses.65 Later, gay men and lesbians benefitted signifi61
62

63

64
65

See generally AMAR, supra note 17.
See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 53 (“The central principles of the American system of freedom
of expression . . . are not the product of a moment of inspired constitutional genius 200-plus years
ago. We owe those principles, instead, to the living, common law Constitution.”).
See id. at 62 (observing that the process of interpreting freedom of speech principles “developed
over fifty years, often through trial and error”). See also BALKIN, supra note 14, at 229 (“Interpreting the equal protection clause today means interpreting it after the New Deal, after the civil
rights revolution, and after the second wave of American feminism.”).
See BALKIN, supra note 14 (observing that constitutional rights evolve in a broad-ranging process
that includes original understandings, common law elaboration, and public debate).
See generally Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: Why Does the
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cantly from the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment precedents
secured by African-Americans.66
Activists and litigants may also seek to alter the understanding of previously established rights relationships. Moreover, new social and constitutional movements can arise, during which multiple constitutional rights
provisions may be relied upon in distinctive ways.
As noted earlier, rights can also come into conflict or tension with one
another. This occurs when rights-holders make separate rights-based
claims, necessitating some balance or other resolution. This process is limited only by the creative energies and talents of activists, litigants, and other
actors in the system. It is perpetual in the sense that rights relationships can
change over time in response to new invocations, strategies, and theories.
New rights associations may form, and new understandings of constitutional rights—both in individual and relational terms—continually develop.
Thus far I have focused on activists and litigants as primary actors in
Rights Dynamism. Owing to their central interpretive function, courts obviously play a central role. They react to and adjudicate litigants’ constitutional
rights claims. In early test cases, courts must distinguish between or among
constitutional rights—free speech and free exercise of religion, for example, or
equal protection and due process. Through this process, courts sift through
multiple rights claims. As explained further below, they define and interpret
the scope and contours of both individual rights and rights relationships.
Rights Dynamism is influenced by a wide variety of actors and influences, which determine whether and how rights interact with one another.
Thus, as noted earlier, through their official acts government officials can
bring rights into contact with one another. Political officials also participate
in discourses in which they associate or combine constitutional rights.
Thus, government officials who favor strong protection of the right to bear
arms might rely on a combination of Second Amendment, First Amendment, privacy, and property arguments.67 Legislative and other officials
who support abortion rights rely on due process, privacy, and equalitybased arguments, while officials who oppose any extension of abortion
rights rely on due process, equality, and free speech rights. Like litigants,
political officials sometimes discuss constitutional rights in the aggregate, in
the alternative, or as conflicting guarantees.
Social discourse regarding constitutional rights can also exhibit some of
these same characteristics. Media outlets and the public at large discuss
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Supreme Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431 (2006) (discussing Jehovah’s Witnesses free speech precedents).
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 99–
100 (1999) (discussing LGBT movement’s reliance on civil rights First Amendment precedents).
See Zick, supra note 2, at 29–36 (discussing non-Second Amendment protections relating to arms).
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and debate the tensions between freedom of expression and equality, privacy and the right to bear arms, and free exercise of religion and equality. As
some commentators noted in the aftermath of the shooting death of Michael Brown, press coverage and public debates seemed to focus myopically
on First Amendment expressive rights rather than other rights allegedly being violated in Ferguson, Missouri.68 This sort of reporting can reflect or
affect the public’s perspective regarding the hierarchy of different rights.
Scholars also participate in, and sometimes significantly affect, rights dynamics. Despite the relative lack of attention to Rights Dynamism, constitutional scholars have commented on particular rights relationships. For example, some have offered substantive theories regarding the relationships
between free speech and free exercise, free speech and equality, and due process and equal protection.69 This work has contributed to judicial and public
understandings of the relationship between and among constitutional rights.70
In Rights Dynamism, the various players and participants can sometimes influence one another. Academic commentary regarding the relational aspects of constitutional rights can affect litigants’ strategic choices as
well as judicial interpretations and case outcomes. New theories and commentaries can lead to changes in the interpretation of rights relationships,
or to further illumination of these relationships. Of course, it is not possible
to establish causal relationships. However, the process suggests that these
influences are indeed present. For example, prior to and during the civil
rights movement, academic commentary on free speech rights may have
affected litigants’ and the Supreme Court’s perception of the relationship
between freedom of expression and racial equality.71 Similarly, long before
Justice Kennedy discussed the illuminating relationship between due process and equality rights in Obergefell, constitutional scholars had already
identified and discussed it.72
In sum, Rights Dynamism is a broad and inclusive process that involves
litigation, adjudication, public discourse, and scholarly commentary con68
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70
71
72

See Dahlia Lithwick & Daria Roithmayr, Ferguson’s Constitutional Crisis, SLATE (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/ferguson_s_
constitutional_crisis_first_amendment_violations_are_only_part.html (lamenting lack of coverage
of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations).
See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992) (explaining
how law banning sodomy demonstrates link between substantive due process and equal protection); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988) (claiming that substantive due process is a
retrospective analysis, whereas equal protection is forward-looking).
See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 4, at 474–75 (describing scholars’ contributions to the shift in LGBTQ
cases from the Due Process Clause to the Equal Protection Clause).
See KALVEN, supra note 19 (examining contemporary civil rights cases in an attempt to clarify theoretical basis for free expression).
See Karlan, supra note 4, at 474 (observing that “the ideas of equality and liberty expressed in the
equal protection and due process clauses each emerge from and reinforce the other”).
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cerning the relationships between and among constitutional rights. Although much of the action takes place in the courts, a variety of actors and
influences participate in the dynamic process of defining and interpreting
rights and their relationships to one another.
C. Dynamic Elaboration
Over time, the process of Rights Dynamism contributes to the elaboration and construction of individual rights and rights relationships. Through
active intersections in which constitutional rights are mashed up, compared, contrasted, and sometimes balanced against one another, participants influence the meanings of rights both independently and in relation
to one another.
In general, the elaborative process occurs over many decades and results
from multiple rights interactions. As illustrated in Part II, as litigants invoke
and rely upon individual rights provisions in various contexts and for a variety of purposes, courts interpret and elaborate the meanings of individual
rights guarantees and the relationships between and sometimes among them.
Dynamic elaboration does not fully establish the meaning of any particular constitutional right or rights relationship. However, it can significantly
affect the interpretation and meaning of constitutional rights. It is thus an
integral part of the interpretive and constructive process.
With regard to many constitutional rights, meaning is derived not solely
from individual text, history, and applications, but also from intersections
and relationships between and sometimes among rights. Through this interactive process, courts and officials do more than shape the meaning of
individual rights provisions. As they adjudicate and interpret at the intersection of freedom of expression and equality, freedom of expression and
free exercise, equal protection and equality, etc., officials establish, influence, and define rights relationships.
As is true of Rights Dynamism, dynamic elaboration is primarily—
though again not exclusively—the province of courts. When deciding cases
at the intersection of neighboring, overlapping, and sometimes conflicting
rights provisions, courts must often make difficult choices regarding (1)
which claims to recognize or disfavor; (2) whether, and if so how, to combine constitutional rights or relate them to one another; and (3) the proper
resolution of tensions and conflicts between constitutional rights.
As they answer these questions, courts do not generally discuss rights in
explicitly relational terms.73 Obergefell, in which the Supreme Court highlighted aspects of the relationship between due process and equal protection
73

See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1069 (observing that the Supreme Court generally segregates rights
provisions and constitutional doctrines).

May 2017]

RIGHTS DYNAMISM

807

rights, is a notable exception.74 Nevertheless, even if they do not articulate
their decisions in relational or cumulative terms, courts are engaged in a
process of dynamic interpretation. When they adjudicate cumulative, aggregate, and other types of claims involving multiple rights, courts construct
the meanings of individual rights in relation to one another. They illuminate, clarify, and sometimes unsettle rights relationships.
As noted, this elaborative process occurs over many decades. It involves
adjudication of numerous controversies in which the subject rights intersect
with one another. Moreover, like Rights Dynamism itself, dynamic interpretation continues in perpetuity. As activists and parties invoke rights,
courts can return to specific intersections as new issues arise. They can affirm or alter the interpretation of rights and their relationships with one another. However, they can also leave things unsettled, thus providing litigants with future opportunities to combine or contrast rights provisions.
For the most part, the actual mechanics of dynamic interpretation are
familiar to common law constitutional adjudication. Courts obviously rely
on ordinary inputs such as briefs, amicus filings, and factual records. However, dynamic interpretation involves a complicating set of factors and influences. Cross-doctrinal developments and considerations play a larger
and more important role in dynamic interpretation than they do in ordinary adjudication of individual rights claims. When courts actively engage
with more than one rights provision at a time, the interpretive enterprise
requires at least implicit recognition of doctrinal effects in more than one
area. Even if courts do not consciously consider these effects, their decisions will often cross doctrinal boundaries.
For example, as explained below, in cases where Free Speech Clause
and Free Exercise Clause claims are brought together, developments in both
the free speech and religious liberty areas can impact the interpretive enterprise.75 Courts interpreting the speech rights of religious adherents must
at least be mindful or aware of changes to free exercise doctrines. They
may interpret free speech rights in response to those changes, or owing to
concerns about them. Similarly, as I also discuss below, changing notions
of constitutional equality can influence judicial interpretation of expressive
rights—and vice versa.76 Courts may expand free speech rights in order to
facilitate equal protection rights, or may interpret free speech claims in light
of changes in equal protection doctrine. At intersection points, courts do
74
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See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (discussing due process and equal protection components of the marital right). For other examples of explicitly cumulative reasoning in
rights cases, see Coenen, supra note 2, at 1078–82.
See discussion infra, Part II.C (arguing that the intersection of freedom of speech and free exercise
of religion has influenced the court’s concepts, doctrines, and principles).
See discussion infra, Part II.B (recounting significant events in civil rights movements that influenced the Court’s identification of certain rights).
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not and indeed cannot always focus on singular constitutional provisions or
doctrines. Rather, they are engaged in an elaborative process that implicates more than one right.
Other distinctive concerns arise when courts engage in dynamic elaboration. When courts adjudicate more than one right at a time, or when one
right is used to facilitate another, the specter of constitutional balancing or
trading rights off against one another can arise. For instance, when they
hear cases concerning free speech rights near abortion clinics, judges might
be influenced by perceptions of the relative strength or worth of rights such
as freedom of speech or abortion.77 When confronted with a tension or
conflict between constitutional rights such as privacy and free speech, or
free speech and free exercise, judges may confront similar tensions or conflicts. These can influence adjudication in situations where rights are presented in the alternative, or facilitate one another, or conflict.
Of course, as in other contexts, courts adjudicating cumulative or aggregate rights claims are subject to certain external influences. For instance, judicial receptivity to certain rights claims might be affected by
changes in official or public attitudes regarding particular claimants or
rights claims. Increased public recognition and support for a constitutional
right may affect how that right is viewed not merely in isolation, but also in
relation to other constitutional rights. At the same time, a decrease in support for a right, or sustained public conflicts regarding a particular right,
may weaken its position vis-à-vis other rights.
For example, as discussed further below, the Supreme Court was initially
more receptive to Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Free Speech Clause claims than their
Free Exercise Clause claims.78 Some have argued that the Court’s preference for free speech over free exercise was related to significant changes in
the American political system and Supreme Court Justices’ personal biases
regarding the constitutional claims of adherents to minority religions.79
To take a more recent example, for many decades courts were more inclined to recognize free expression rights on behalf of LGBT claimants than
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See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices Defend the Speech They
Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First Amendment 11–12 (2012) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2107425 (discussing whether judges favor
litigants who share similar political or ideological commitments); Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech About Favored Rights: Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need
for an Objective Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 179, 198–99 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme
Court sometimes favors anti-abortion speech).
See infra Part II.C (finding that the first few Jehovah’s Witnesses’ cases did not even address the
free exercise claims).
See Feldman, supra note 65, at 474–75 (arguing that the development of a pluralistic democracy
led to the favoring of free expression over religious freedom with the help of a protestantcontrolled Supreme Court); cf. STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 67–70 (discussing the external influences that shaped modern free speech principles).
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substantive equality claims.80 Only after public attitudes regarding sexual
orientation and sexual orientation equality changed dramatically—in part
as a consequence of robust exercise of First Amendment rights of speech
and association—did courts begin to recognize substantive LGBT equality
and privacy rights.81
Like other forms of common law adjudication, the dynamic elaboration
of individual rights is not linear—it does not progress in some sequential or
orderly manner. Indeed, owing in part to the involvement of more than
one right, dynamic elaboration may be even more reactive, unintentional,
and unpredictable than common law counterparts.
The results or products of dynamic interpretation bear these observations out. There are myriad possibilities. For instance, the elaborative process might be truncated or short-circuited. Consider in this regard the present understanding of the relationship between the Free Speech Clause and
other First Amendment rights—assembly, petition, press, and association.
The Supreme Court has effectively merged all of these neighboring guarantees with the Free Speech Clause.82 That interpretation is not necessarily
settled for all time. As part of the process of Rights Dynamism, scholars are
actively re-examining these relationships—toward the end of convincing
courts to independently interpret and enforce these rights.83 But right now,
there are few opportunities for doctrinal dynamics to develop between and
among these First Amendment provisions.
The fate of the Free Speech Clause’s immediate neighbors demonstrates that one right may ultimately be subjugated to another. Dynamic
elaboration can potentially create rights redundancies, such that one right
no longer serves any special or distinctive purpose. In the most extreme
case, one right in a rights relationship may totally succumb to another and
cease to have any independent meaning.84

80
81

82

83
84

See ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, at 98–137 (discussing early cases involving speech, association, and
press).
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563–78 (2003) (overruling prior precedent that allowed
governments to punish homosexual sodomy); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–96
(2013) (invalidating federal Defense of Marriage Act on due process and equal protection
grounds).
See Bhagwat, supra note 1, at 1098–99 (“The rest of the First Amendment—the Press, Assembly,
and Petition Clauses—might as well not exist.”); INAZU, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that there is
good reason to think that the right to freedom of association has been subsumed into the blanket
freedom of speech provision); KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 22, at 158 (discussing Supreme Court
cases that decide issues that would theoretically fit under the Petition Clause under the Free
Speech Clause); West, supra note 22, at 358 (finding that the Free Speech Clause has received significant attention while the freedom of the press has been largely ignored).
See generally Bhagwat, supra note 1; INAZU, supra note 22; KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 22; West,
supra note 22.
See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 71 (2001) (discussing relationship between the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause).
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More typically, active intersection affects the meanings of individual
rights in relation to one another.85 As the Supreme Court suggested in
Obergefell, constitutional rights may be interpreted such that they illuminate
or clarify one another.86 There the Court engaged in what Professor Michael Coenen recently described as “combination analysis”—the explicit
justification of outcomes by reference to multiple rights provisions acting
together.87 Of course, rights do not always or necessarily support one another when adjudicated together. Rights provisions may also be interpreted in ways that complicate, restrict, or even undermine one another.88
As a result of their various couplings and interactions, constitutional
rights can also combine with one another in unique and sometimes confounding ways. For example, so-called “hybrid” rights conjoin two rights in
a manner that seemingly produces a viable claim where one based on either
right alone might fail. Thus, the Supreme Court has indicated that whereas a stand-alone Free Exercise Clause claim might fail, a “hybrid” claim involving free exercise and another right—such as the right to privacy or
freedom of speech—might succeed.89
Since dynamic interpretation cuts across two—and sometimes more—
constitutional provisions, these resulting elaborations are typically bi- or
multi-directional. Thus, when they intersect, the meanings of both freedom
of expression and constitutional equality, both freedom of expression and
free exercise, and both equal protection and due process can be affected.
In the elaborative process, rights in active relation both influence and are
influenced by one another.
This is why, to varying degrees, contemporary understandings and interpretations of constitutional rights are a function of their relationships to
other rights. Thus, the meaning of the modern Equal Protection Clause is
derived in part from its interactions with the Due Process Clause. Similarly, current understandings of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause
are, in part, a function of their frequent and dynamic intersection with the
Equal Protection Clause. The contemporary meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause is linked to its interactions with the Free Speech Clause. As to all of
these pairings, we can also say “vice versa”—the elaborative influence generally runs in both directions.
85
86
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88
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See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 4 (examining relationship between the Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause).
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015) (discussing relationship between the
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause as it relates to marriage).
See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1075–77 (explaining the concept of combination analysis).
See Karlan, supra note 4, at 480–83 (suggesting that Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause have sometimes limited one another’s scope).
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (recognizing the “hybrid” constitutional
claim). See also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1109, 1122 (1990) (criticizing the concept of “hybrid” rights).
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Dynamic elaboration supplements our understanding of constitutional
interpretation. It helps to illuminate the processes by which constitutional
rights are subject to change. Along with original understandings, precedents, and other sources of constitutional meaning, dynamic elaboration
contributes something important to the interpretive enterprise. As rights interact and socialize over extended periods of time, constitutional rights provisions can take on narrower, broader, or even distinctive new meanings.
II. EXAMPLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS
Part I discussed the relational nature of constitutional rights and described the dynamic processes in which rights intersect and are interpreted.
Part II uses three rights relationships as examples and illustrations. Rather
than examine all of the details relating to each rights relationship, the object
is to show in broad terms how Rights Dynamism and dynamic elaboration
operate. The first relationship considered is that between the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and its Equal Protection Clause.90 Obergefell is one product of the dynamic intersection of these clauses. However,
it is only a single decision point in a long and complex relationship. The
other two examples involve the Free Speech Clause and its intersection
with other constitutional rights—namely, the Equal Protection Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause. The object is not merely to describe the relationships, but rather to analyze the rights interactions and critically assess the
processes and products of dynamic elaboration.
A. Due Process and Equal Protection
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court relied on the synergistic connections between the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
to recognize a right to marriage for gay men and lesbians.91 Obergefell was a
culmination point in a dynamic process that began at the Fourteenth
Amendment’s framing and involved many decades of activism, litigation,
doctrinal change, public debate, governmental action, and scholarly examination. This initial illustration briefly highlights some of the general aspects of Rights Dynamism and dynamic elaboration. The two other rights
relationships are considered in greater detail.
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91

The discussion in this Part is limited to the substantive aspects of these guarantees, and does not
consider their procedural dimensions.
See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03 (discussing relationship between Due Process Clause and
Equal Protection Clause as it relates to marriage).
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1. From Synergy to Separation
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause are close textual neighbors. Their relationship has deep textual
and historical roots. The clauses are intimately connected in terms of their
framing, ratification, and central purposes.
As a matter of their original dynamic, the two provisions intersected with
and illuminated one another.92 As Jack Balkin has observed, “[e]vidence of
the connection between due process and equality is everywhere in [the] Reconstruction-era debates.”93 As concepts and then later as rights, due process
and equal protection illuminated one another. Due process was a fundamental guarantee that included substantive equality rights.94 Moreover, as Akhil
Amar has explained, it was understood during early debates that “the Equal
Protection Clause was in part a clarifying gloss on the due process idea.”95
From the beginning, at least at a very broad level of abstraction, both
clauses were about fundamental fairness. In their substantive dimensions,
due process and equal protection prohibit governments from taking actions
that single out, discriminate, or create castes. They offer important protections for personal dignity. This was the understanding before courts engaged
regularly with the due process and equal protection guarantees in the twentieth century.
Likely with this understanding, in the modern era litigants frequently invoked the due process and equal protection guarantees together or cumulatively. This has occurred in a wide range of contexts, including cases involving socio-economic regulations, fundamental procreative rights, claims
relating to access to courts, race discrimination, presidential elections, and
marriage.96 Due process and equal protection rights have also intersected in
so-called “fundamental interest” or “substantive equal protection” cases.97
In these and other cases, litigants sought relief under one or both provisions.
At the same time, legal scholars have also studied, and in some cases
sought to influence, the manner in which due process and equal protection
92
93
94
95
96
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See BALKIN, supra note 14, at 220 (discussing historical overlap between the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses).
Id. at 251.
Id.
Amar, supra note 12, at 772.
See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (noting that both due process and equal
protection had been invoked in a challenge to mandatory sterilization law, but relying on equal
protection); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 108–10 (1949) (rejecting due process
and equal protection challenges to an advertising restriction); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16–
17 (1956) (relying on both due process and equal protection to invalidate denial of transcript for
indigent defendant in direct appeal); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a ban
on interracial marriage under both equal protection and due process guarantees).
See generally Karlan, supra note 4, at 473–82 (examining the relationship between the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause).
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rights relate to one another. Some prominent scholarly accounts have emphasized the distinctions between due process and equal protection.98 Thus,
rather than focus on points of overlap or intersection, commentators have
chosen to emphasize the distinctive characteristics of each right.99 By contrast, other influential treatments have sought to integrate or combine the
two provisions, such that they protect a single right—“equal citizenship,”
for example.100 However, as Pam Karlan has observed, one of the potential
pitfalls of this approach is that “[t]he two clauses become, rather than inform, one another.”101
The Supreme Court has never taken a firm side in this debate. In its
rulings, the due process-equal protection relationship has rarely been explicitly recognized or addressed (Obergefell, again, being an obvious exception). Despite having ample opportunities to do so, the Court has never
elaborated a consistent approach to these provisions or a coherent account
of their relationship to one another.
In fundamental interest and other special cases, the Court has occasionally relied on both the due process and equal protection provisions—without
explaining what, if any, relationship they have to one another.102 In Loving
v. Virginia, which invalidated a state miscegenation law, the Court relied almost exclusively on the Equal Protection Clause, but briefly stated at the
end of the opinion that the law also violated the Due Process Clause.103
However, far more typically the Court has explained decisions either in
terms of due process or equal protection. In general, particularly if one
looks at its most iconic decisions, the Court has essentially treated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses as fungible provisions.104
Over time, the Supreme Court has developed separate doctrines relating to each clause. Equal protection is now commonly understood to pro-
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See Karlan, supra note 4, at 475–76 (discussing the work of constitutional scholars).
See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C. L. REV. 375, 382–83, 385–86 (1985) (arguing the Court should have used the Equal Protection Clause to protect abortion rights).
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1977) (“The substantive core of the [14th] amendment . . . is a principle of equal citizenship, which presumptively guarantees to each individual the right to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member.”).
Karlan, supra note 4, at 475.
See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107, 120 (1996) (invalidating a restriction on access to
courts under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause). But see id. at 130
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Petitioner requests relief under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, though she does not specify how either Clause affords it. The majority accedes to
petitioner’s request. But . . . the majority does not specify the source of the relief it grants.”).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (relying on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (relying on the Due Process
Clause of Fifth Amendment).
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tect against certain purposeful and invidious governmental classifications.105
In its substantive aspects, due process protects certain “fundamental”
rights.106 Thus, modern doctrines segregate two constitutional provisions
that, at least as an original matter, were closely bound together and acted as
glosses upon one another.
Like the other rights pairings, due process and equal protection have a
long history of active intersection and interaction. Nevertheless, litigants
have generally sought relief under one or the other provision, while courts
and scholars have generally ignored the relational dynamics between the
clauses. Little attention has been paid to the manner in which due process
and equal protection rights have actively intersected with and influenced
one another over time.
2. “Stereoscopic” Elaboration
As Obergefell shows, due process and equal protection can be mutually illuminating guarantees. Rights Dynamism and the concept of dynamic
elaboration can help explain how.
Rights Dynamism suggests that judicial and scholarly accounts of the
due process-equal protection intersection are missing something important.
When due process and equal protection are pressed together and mashed
up over many decades, there are bound to be significant relational and
elaborative effects. On closer examination, although they may be subtler in
this relationship than in those discussed below, the influences are present.
As Pam Karlan has explained, we can discover these relational dynamics and effects only by viewing due process and equal protection rights “stereoscopically”—i.e., through the lenses of both clauses.107 Thus, instead of
disaggregating or merging the provisions together, we ought to view these
rights as dynamically relational. As Professor Karlan suggests, this approach reveals that the intersection between due process and equal protection leads to “synergistic effects, producing results that neither clause might
reach by itself.”108
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court’s due process/equal protection
precedents generally rely on one provision or the other—they disaggregate,
treating due process and equal protection as parallel, rather than intertwined, rights. However, in some contexts, the Court has developed doc-

105
106

107
108

See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (explaining that
classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin are subject to strict scrutiny).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (plurality opinion (explaining the fundamental rights jurisprudence that has developed with respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
See Karlan, supra note 4, at 474.
Id.
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trines that at least implicitly bring the clauses together. These interactions
highlight what is unique about rights dynamics and dynamic elaboration.
Consider the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning the right to vote.109
The decisions have generally been treated as resting on equal protection
grounds. However, as Professor Karlan has shown, they are deeply influenced by due process-fundamental rights considerations.110 As mentioned
earlier, due process doctrines and principles identify the liberties government cannot deny its citizens equal access to without compelling justification. The right to vote cases are thus an example of the kind of “innovation” that can occur when two related, but still distinct, clauses are invoked
and adjudicated together.111 This innovation is a product of dynamic elaboration. It has occurred over many decades, but largely beneath the surface in judicial opinions.
Rights dynamics can also impose limits on doctrinal innovation. In decisions involving access to courts, for example, due process principles provide
positive content to the right of access but simultaneously constrain the scope
of these access rights by limiting them to “fundamental” interests.112 The
dynamic process in which rights interact is not a one-way ratchet. As they
intersect over time, rights may facilitate and illuminate one another. But
they may also impose conceptual and doctrinal constraints on one another.
What is important is that due process and equal protection have not
merely converged with one another. They have actively intersected and
combined, in ways that have influenced and illuminated each right and their
relationship to one another.113 Over time, these interactions have partially
determined the meanings of due process and equal protection. The product
of this intersection, particularly in the voting and court access cases, was a
hybrid construction featuring bi-directional effects. Due process and equal
protection sometimes facilitated one another, while in other contexts these
rights limited one another’s scope and utility. Only by looking in both directions, and specifically at the relational dynamics, can we fully understand the
substance of the due process and equal protection provisions.
3. Obergefell as/and Rights Dynamism
Obergefell v. Hodges is most notable for its marriage equality holding.
However, it is also a paradigm example of Rights Dynamism and dynamic
elaboration. Plaintiffs challenged marriage bans on both due process and
equal protection grounds. The Court could have disaggregated these
109
110
111
112
113

See id. at 478–80 (discussing right to vote cases).
Id. at 480.
Id. at 477.
See id. at 480–83.
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996).
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claims and relied on either rights provision. Instead, the Obergefell Court
wrote the following with respect to the relationship between the Fourteenth
Amendment’s two clauses:
In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of
the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two
Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right. This
interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.114

This passage reflects an understanding of the dynamic relationship between due process and equal protection. What lies beneath it is a long history of dynamic intersection between these rights. Obergefell is an example of
the sort of dynamic elaboration that occurs as a result of Rights Dynamism.
In a commentary on Obergefell, Professor Kenji Yoshino explains how
cross-doctrinal developments ultimately “freed” liberty under the Due Process
Clause, making it possible for the Court to break free of the constraints of
“substantive due process” doctrine.115 Yoshino also demonstrates how, over
the course of five decades, the Court’s substantive due process doctrine underwent significant changes in areas ranging from abortion, to rights concerning death, to sexual liberty. As he observes, scholarly treatments of the due
process and equal protection guarantees likely contributed to these changes.116
Rather than criticize the Court for not explicitly recognizing a single
source for the right to marriage equality, Yoshino defends the Court’s relational approach. He explains how the Court’s own conception of the relationship between due process and equal protection changed over time, such
that the Court’s marriage equality rationale relied on a conception of liberty that was grounded in both due process and equal protection principles.
This “synthesis of liberty and equality” is one point in the evolutionary
process.117 The passage quoted earlier, which emphasizes the convergence
of liberty and equality and their mutual illumination, was a product of decades of activism, political and cultural changes, scholarly examination, and
common law doctrinal development. The Court’s elaboration of a right to
“antisubordination liberty,” as Yoshino describes it, is based on the idea
that due process and equal protection facilitate, illuminate, and in some respects cabin one another.118
Obergefell marks an important milestone in the relationship between due
process and equal protection. The decision adopts and elaborates, although in relatively cryptic terms, a relational interpretation of the due pro114
115
116
117
118

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (citations omitted).
See Yoshino, supra note 8, at 148–71 (2015) (discussing due process doctrine before and after Obergefell).
See id. at 156–57, 164 (discussing academic “backlash” to narrow conceptions of liberty).
Id. at 171–72.
Id. at 174; see also Tribe, supra note 7.
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cess and equal protection guarantees. In some respects, that elaboration
comes full circle—it returns to the framing-era recognition that the clauses
are distinctive, yet mutually reinforcing.
As Professor Laurence Tribe argues, “Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential
achievement is to have tightly wound the double helix of Due Process and
Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity—and to have located that
doctrine in a tradition of constitutional interpretation as an exercise in public education.”119 As Tribe’s account recognizes, Rights Dynamism is a process that involves courts and the larger public—the people, the press, and
commentators – in a discourse about the evolution of constitutional rights.
Obergefell will not be the last word with regard to the due process-equal
protection relationship. What “antisubordination liberty,” or “equal dignity,” will ultimately become depends on how activists, courts, scholars, and the
public invoke and interpret fundamental rights and equality in future cases.
Obergefell is a single, but important, point in a perpetual process in which due
process and equal protection rights dynamically intersect with one another.
B. Freedom of Speech and Equal Protection
This Section and the next discuss other constitutional rights relationships in somewhat greater detail. From their first introduction up to the
present, the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause have frequently and actively intersected with one another.120 Activists and litigants have pursued free speech
claims (as well as right of association and free press claims) in order to facilitate a variety of equality movements and agendas. Litigants have invoked
free speech and equality guarantees separately, in the alternative, and cumulatively. Courts and commentators have examined the connections and
distinctions between free speech and equality rights, and articulated bidirectional constructions of both.
1. Textual and Historical Connections
When the Fourteenth Amendment was debated, Reconstruction Republicans vigorously resisted restrictions on First Amendment freedom of
speech and freedom of press rights. They understood that freedom of
speech, in particular, was critically important to the recognition and effective exercise of equal protection rights.121 Like the due process and equal
protection guarantees, freedom of speech and equal protection were closely
119
120
121

Tribe, supra note 7, at 17.
I have discussed this relationship at length elsewhere. See generally Zick, supra note 10.
See AMAR, supra note 17, at 235 (observing that Reconstruction Republicans frequently mentioned
and invoked expressive rights in debates).
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linked from the beginning.
During the 1930s, the Supreme Court relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to “incorporate” the Free Speech Clause
and other First Amendment rights.122 Incorporation was itself a dynamic
process, one that occurred in fits and starts until nearly all of the Bill of
Rights guarantees had been applied to state and local governments. This
second major intersection significantly broadened the scope and potential
power of the First Amendment’s various provisions. Owing to the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
the First Amendment would be applied not just to the federal government
but also to states and localities.123
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was ratified so
that newly freed slaves, and oppressed racial minorities more generally,
would be protected from discriminatory state action.124 At their respective
cores, however, freedom of speech and equality rights share a common
concern with the evil of governmental discrimination. Both the Free
Speech Clause and the Equal Protection Clause were enacted so that minorities, outsiders, and dissidents would be protected from political majorities represented by the state.
These historical and substantive connections have influenced the relationship between freedom of speech and constitutional equality from the
beginning. As these clauses have matured in proximity to one another,
their meanings and relationship have changed dramatically.
2. Facilitative and Cumulative Claims
As I have indicated, it is not possible to follow each and every twist and
turn with respect to the dynamic intersection between freedom of speech
and equal protection. Painting with broader strokes, however, we can see
Rights Dynamism at work and trace the general developments in terms of
dynamic elaboration.
In the modern era, particularly after the process of incorporation, First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been joined in two
distinct, but related, ways. Equality advocates of many stripes have invoked
First Amendment rights in order to facilitate the recognition and eventual
enforcement of substantive Equal Protection Clause rights.125 Litigants

122
123
124

125

See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the Free Speech Clause and
Free Press Clause).
Id.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (explaining that the clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination
in the States).
See, e.g., KALVEN, supra note 19 (discussing use of First Amendment expressive claims to facilitate
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have also invoked these rights cumulatively, demanding relief under either
or sometimes both guarantees.126
The first type of invocation, which we can call a facilitative claim, uses
First Amendment rights as a means of obtaining substantive equality
rights.127 The primary purpose of invoking the Free Speech Clause is to
obtain basic protections for the group in terms of rights to speak, publish,
and associate—in other words, to gain recognition of a right to “equal expression” or “expressive equality.”128 This hybrid form of right is then used
to communicate in public, distribute information about minority groups,
and associate for the purpose of advancing the cause of equality.
In the second type of invocation, which we can label a cumulative claim,
activists and litigants invoke both the Free Speech Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause to challenge discriminatory governmental action. Courts
must then decide which, if either, constitutional right best “fits” the stated
claim and whether that specific right has been violated. In order to do so,
judges must consider and elaborate the meanings of freedom of speech and
equal protection. And they must do so in contexts where the two rights are
both present and potentially viable sources for constitutional claims.
Under both approaches, notice that litigants bring First Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment rights into close and frequent contact with one
another. They seek expressive equality rights, test the boundaries of existing doctrines under both clauses, and sometimes press for recognition of
new rights under one or the other. Facilitative and cumulative claims have
highlighted overlapping constitutional protections under the clauses. They
have also provided courts with countless opportunities to elaborate on the
meanings of free speech and equal protection, and to consider the relationship between freedom of speech and constitutional equality.
Facilitative claims have deepened our understanding of the connections
between First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Religious
adherents, labor activists, feminists, race equality advocates, and LGBT activists have all relied upon First Amendment rights like freedom of speech,
association, and press to facilitate equal protection agendas. In doing so,
these movements have contributed significantly to a distinctive elaboration
of the relationship between freedom of expression and equality. They have

126
127
128

racial equality agenda); Zick, supra note 10 (discussing ways in which African-Americans and
LGBT persons used freedom of speech and other First Amendment rights to facilitate constitutional equality movements); CARLOS A. BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY:
A CONTENTIOUS HISTORY (2017) (examining the use of First Amendment claims by—and
against—LGBT persons).
See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460–61 (1980) (observing that a discriminatory picketing
law implicated both the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment).
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, at Ch. 3 (discussing use of expressive rights claims during the early
eras of the LGBT equality movement).
See Zick, supra note 10, at 18–21 (discussing expressive equality concept).
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demonstrated and strengthened the synergies between these rights.
Consider for example the constitutional movement for racial equality.
Brown v. Board of Education did not actually secure constitutional equality—
even in the public schools.129 Significant progress toward racial equality
required a lengthy campaign of legal and political agitation. As Harry Kalven, Jr. observed, during the 1950s and 1960s, the NAACP focused significant energy and resources on First Amendment litigation.130 The NAACP
invoked freedom of speech and other First Amendment rights to challenge
state efforts to suppress criticism of government, limit private association,
restrict public protest, and exclude African-Americans from public accommodations.131 Not all of these challenges were successful. However, collectively, they created critical breathing space for the civil rights movement.
That space protected public protests and other forms of contention, which
in turn facilitated the enactment of civil rights legislation.132
Advocates of sexual orientation equality, to take another example, followed a very similar path.133 Particularly during the earliest stages of agitation, gay men and lesbians relied extensively on expressive rights in order to
facilitate public acceptance and equal treatment under law.134 Although
courts were not willing or prepared to recognize equality rights on behalf of
gays and lesbians, they were willing to recognize and enforce their basic expressive rights.135 The First Amendment thus offered an early path to a
form of constitutional equality that did not entail demonstrating suspect
classification status under the Equal Protection Clause.
First Amendment agitation did not always produce results for advocates
of gay and lesbian equality.136 However, as was the case regarding racial

129
130
131
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133
134
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347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See generally KALVEN, supra note 19 (describing civil rights advocates’ reliance on First Amendment
claims).
See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 (1965) (invalidating conviction of the leader of a group
wishing to protest racial segregation); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80
(1964) (establishing the high burden for public official libel plaintiffs in a case involving criticism
of actions taken by Southern officials against civil rights activists); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 238 (1963) (invalidating breach of peace convictions against civil rights protesters);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that an Alabama order
requiring the NAACP to disclose its membership list violated the group’s First Amendment right
of association). See also KALVEN, supra note 19, Ch. 3 (discussing free speech challenges to segregated lunch counters).
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 95 (2014) (noting
that “television made all the difference, transforming the terrible scenes into an ugly symbol that
shocked viewers throughout the nation”); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 440–41 (2004)
(noting the rise in public sympathy for civil rights causes after violent scenes were televised).
See Zick, supra note 10 (discussing LGBT equality movement); BALL, supra note 125 (same).
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, Ch. 3 (discussing early free speech, association, and free press cases).
See BALL, supra note 125.
See Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 63 (1996) (“As an all-
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equality, free speech and other expressive claims helped secure critically
important space for the gay equality movement. Perhaps most importantly,
recognition of basic expressive rights facilitated gay and lesbian political agitation. As Dale Carpenter has observed, in this and other respects, “[t]he
First Amendment created gay America.”137
As courts decided expressive claims brought by equality advocates, they
simultaneously elaborated both free speech and equality rights. Each free
speech victory communicated basic respect for at least expressive equality,
and perhaps for a more substantive equality down the line. For equality
advocates, successful First Amendment claims have generally been the first
formal evidence that they enjoy any form of equality rights. Indeed, for extended periods of time, recognition of expressive equality was the only real
sense in which African-Americans, gays and lesbians, and other suppressed
minorities were considered “equal” citizens. Like Obergefell’s recognition of
“equal dignity” rights, judicial recognition of “expressive equality” rights
fashioned a distinctive liberty from the principles and values of two constitutional guarantees. Acting as background principles, expressive rights influenced the recognition and enforcement of equality rights.138
We have been focusing on the courts. However, this synergistic and stereoscopic process occurred not only in courthouses, but in the streets, at
lunch counters, in newspapers and other publications, in academic circles,
and in homes and workplaces. Press coverage of public protests and other
expressive activities put racial equality on the national agenda.139 Iconic images of the events at Selma, Stonewall, and other places of conflict altered
public opinion and eventually helped to produce legislative reforms.140 Legal academics highlighted the connection between freedom of expression
and constitutional equality, and published sophisticated First Amendment
arguments against laws that denied equal expressive rights.141 Recognition
and respect for expressive rights emboldened private and public coming out,

137
138
139
140
141

encompassing metaphor or a complete theory of constitutional rights for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, [freedom of expression] falls short.”); ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, at 196 (observing that the
First Amendment “performed unevenly” during the gay equality movement).
Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1525 (2001).
See Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1716 (1993) (“Expression,
equality, and privacy coexist as components of rights claims that are mutually dependent.”).
See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 132 (discussing connection between public contention and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
See KLARMAN, supra note 132, at 440–41 (discussing television’s role in the racial equality movement).
See, e.g., KALVEN, supra note 19; David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000).
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social and political organizing, and demands for equal treatment.142
First Amendment rights, doctrines, and principles have also facilitated
constitutional debate and discourse concerning constitutional equality.
This discourse is a condition precedent to the elaboration and extension of
constitutional equality rights.143 Civil rights legislation was the culmination
of a decades-long national conversation about racial equality.144 Similarly,
in Obergefell, the Supreme Court emphasized that the nation had been engaged in a decades-long discourse about sexual orientation and equality.145
According to the Court, this national debate had led to significant changes
in our collective understanding of constitutional equality, which in turn
supported recognition of a right to marital equality.
As they relate to cumulative (as opposed to facilitative) claims, the dynamics between First Amendment expressive rights and Fourteenth Amendment equality rights have followed a distinct path. Prior to the 1980s, the
Supreme Court generally treated free speech and equality as fungible
rights. Civil rights and other speakers challenged laws and ordinances that
restricted picketing, protests, and other expressive activities on both First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.146 As the Court observed in one such case:
Because Chicago treats some picketing differently from others, we analyze
this ordinance in terms of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Of course, the equal protection claim in this case is closely
intertwined with First Amendment interests; the Chicago ordinance affects
picketing, which is expressive conduct; moreover, it does so by classifications formulated in terms of the subject of the picketing.147

Note that the Court treats the “claim” as arising under the Equal Protection Clause, but acknowledges that “First Amendment interests” are also
implicated. These things, the Court says, are “intertwined.” What it does
not explain, in any depth or detail, is that in such cases First Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees provide overlapping, but still distinctive, constitutional coverage. The ordinance regulated “expressive
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See ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, at 145 (observing that Warren Court decisions in the equal protection, free speech, and other areas “facilitated the explosion of coming out stories, gay rights organizations, and political and social activism immediately following Stonewall”); id. at 141 (noting
the connection between coming out and legal gains for homosexuals).
See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2030 (2003) (observing that “the
First Amendment ensures that all Americans can express their beliefs about the Constitution”).
See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 132 (examining the complex political and judicial processes
that led to civil rights advances during the twentieth century).
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (describing public and official discourse
concerning same-sex marriage issue).
See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (challenge to an ordinance that
prohibited most picketing outside schools, but exempted labor picketing).
Id. (footnote omitted).
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conduct” (picketing), and thus implicated rights under the Free Speech
Clause (and the Assembly Clause). The ordinance also set up a classification that distinguished between types of individual picketers, which is what
triggered the Equal Protection Clause. In such cases, expressive and equality rights act in concert and as related or cognate guarantees. They protect
against similar but distinctive types of governmental discrimination.
Today, litigants continue to bring cumulative or alternative claims similar
to the one described above. However, over time, the Court has clarified the
doctrinal boundaries between freedom of speech and equality in a manner
that generally produces a fairly strict segregation of rights claims. Modernday litigants have the best chance of success when they challenge contentbased restrictions affecting picketing and similar activities on First Amendment grounds. The doctrinal calculus here is straightforward. Under the
Equal Protection Clause, classifications not based on suspect or quasi-suspect
differences are subject only to rational basis review, while under the First
Amendment content-based speech regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.148
In essence, as a result of doctrinal development, separate doctrines now
channel claims regulating expression based on content into a First Amendment framework, while claims challenging other types of discriminatory state
action are channeled into a Fourteenth Amendment framework.
This channeling and segregation resembles the modern treatment of
claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as described
earlier. In both contexts, courts have segregated rights rather than elaborated the synergies between them. In both contexts, doctrinal clarity has
come at the potential cost of eliminating rights synergies or at least serious
consideration of the connections between rights.
To highlight just one example, owing to the constraints of the Equal
Protection Clause, gay men and lesbians relied heavily—and largely unsuccessfully—on the Free Speech Clause in challenges to the military’s Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell policy and in employment discrimination cases.149 Rather
148

149

See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (noting that the First Amendment stands for the
proposition that the government may not prohibit expression even if it finds it offensive or disagreeable); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
For federal courts of appeals cases rejecting the First Amendment argument, see Able v. United
States, 155 F.3d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1998) (overturning the district court’s ruling that the first
amendment was violated); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that the First Amendment is not implicated when the discharge was on the basis of
conduct); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 263 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the First Amendment
argument against the DOD directive); Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1296 (2d Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the argument that the First Amendment is violated); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915,
931 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that because the statute only targets acts the First Amendment is not implicated); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (rejecting a
facial challenge under the First Amendment because the directive does not exclusively apply to
speech); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting plaintiff’s First Amendment argument because she was not discharged because of her speech); Woodward v. United
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than viewing government actions in these cases as implicating both free
speech and equality rights, courts focused myopically on freedom of speech.
In doing so, they did not generally perceive any connection between expressive and equality rights—even in cases involving the explicit singling
out of gay and lesbian communicative activities.150
Despite judicial segregation, facilitative and cumulative claims have significantly contributed to individual and relational understandings of expressive and equality rights. Facilitative claims supported a right to expressive
equality that was critical to the advancement of constitutional equality and
civil rights. Cumulative claims highlighted the similarities and common
purposes of First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Prior to
their doctrinal separation, these rights served as intersecting grounds for
challenging discriminatory enactments that restricted or suppressed expressive activity. Doctrinal dynamics eventually pulled the rights apart, with
important implications for both Fourteenth Amendment and First
Amendment rights.
3. Dissent, Exclusion, and Conflict
Rights Dynamism is not a static process. Activists and litigants can repurpose constitutional rights to serve new and distinctive ends. During the
1950s and 1960s, race equality advocates obtained recognition for the important right to associate for the purpose of expressing support for equal protection and other rights.151 In ensuing decades, civic organizations invoked—
largely unsuccessfully—the First Amendment as a ground for excluding women
and African-Americans from membership positions.152 Later, expressive organizations successfully invoked free speech and expressive association rights
to exclude gay men and lesbians from membership—despite public accommodations laws that prohibited discrimination on these grounds.153

150
151
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States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding the Navy’s discriminatory practice against
homosexual conduct was rationally related to a permissible government purpose); Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that there was “absolutely no First Amendment violation”).
See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 141, at 319, 335.
See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958) (holding that an Alabama
order requiring the NAACP to disclose its membership list violated the group’s First Amendment
right of association).
See New York State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1988) (upholding as
constitutional a New York law which forbids membership organizations from excluding women
and minorities); Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987) (holding that women could not be excluded on expressive grounds because of the State’s
compelling interest to eliminate discrimination); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628
(1984) (holding that women could not be excluded from organization on expressive grounds).
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (application of anti-discrimination law to
require Scouts to admit leader who was openly gay violated Scouts’ right of expressive association); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995)
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These conflicts and precedents have contributed something important to
our understanding of the expressive-equality relationship. As I have discussed, equality movements have greatly benefitted from First Amendment
dissenters’ rights. Civil rights and equality advocates have relied heavily on
free speech, association, and free press rights to challenge an array of official
repression and discrimination. However, the exclusionary cases demonstrate that the relationship between First Amendment expressive rights and
Fourteenth Amendment equality rights is not always, or necessarily, synergistic and collaborative. Expressive rights, including the right to speak and
the right to associate, are quintessentially dissenters’ rights. As such, they
can be invoked not only by equality advocates, but also by those who resist
the expansion of equality rights or state orthodoxy regarding those rights.
These particular invocations and the resulting precedents created a new
dynamic between freedom of speech (and expressive association) and equal
protection—including a new interpretive dynamic. Because they placed
expressive and equality rights squarely in tension with one another, exclusionary invocations of the First Amendment pressed courts to balance expressive rights against rights to equal treatment. In some instances, particularly with respect to exclusion of gay men and lesbians, that balancing
produced an interpretation of the First Amendment as a formal limit on,
rather than a facilitator of, equal protection rights.154
The exclusionary cases highlight some of the basic mechanics and interpretive effects of Rights Dynamism. Litigants and activists invoked an
expressive right in a new manner and for a new purpose—one that was
consistent with traditional values of dissent and associative freedom, to be
sure, but that also complicated understandings of the relationship between
expressive and equality rights.155 Instead of working toward the shared goal
of equality, in this context the relationship between expressive and equality
rights became far more tense and strained.
As noted, Rights Dynamism is not merely an internal, court-centric
process. As Professor Carlos Ball has recently shown, gay rights and First
Amendment rights have a long and contentious social and political history.156 Many cultural and political forces influenced the turn from First
Amendment shield to First Amendment sword. Broad public debates
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(application of anti-discrimination law to require parade organizers to allow gay group to march
in parade violates organizers’ right not to be compelled to speak); BALL, supra note 125 (focusing
on the use of First Amendment expressive and religious liberty rights to oppose LGBT inclusion
and equality).
See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 659 (holding that Boy Scouts of America had a First Amendment right
to exclude gay men and lesbians from membership).
See generally BALL, supra note 125, Chs. 6, 7 (examining the use of First Amendment rights as exclusionary weapons during the LGBT equality movement).
See id. Ch. 6 (discussing the cultural and political background for exclusionary invocations of the
Free Speech Clause).
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about free speech protection played a role. Among other things, the exclusionary cases were decided at roughly the same time that courts, scholars,
and the public were considering the regulation of hateful and derogatory
speech directed in particular at African-Americans.157
The upshot of that conversation, in judicial fora and more generally,
was a strong re-affirmation of First Amendment anti-orthodoxy principles
that prohibit government from suppressing speech on the ground that it is
hateful, derogatory, or exclusionary.158 First Amendment rights are not always a trump; however, in American culture and jurisprudence they exert
powerful moral and constitutional influence.159
Cross-doctrinal influences also played a role in ushering in and sustaining this new phase of the expression-equality relationship. Particularly in
cases involving exclusion of gay men and lesbians, the success of the expressive claims related, in part, to the perceived weakness of the equality interest being asserted. Under equal protection doctrine, government actions
that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation are reviewed under a
forgiving rational basis standard.160 Under that standard, governments are
not precluded from taking sexual orientation into account. Thus, in contrast to race and gender equality rights, LGBT equality rights were not robust enough to overcome some expressive association claims.
Rights Dynamism is an ongoing and perpetual process. The Court’s
First Amendment decisions preserved limited organizational rights to exclude persons on expressive grounds, but also allowed the broader social
and political debate concerning LGBT rights to continue. Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s exclusionary decisions were not the final word. Indeed,
as public and official perceptions of LGBT persons and their rights evolved,
some organizations—most notably the Boy Scouts of America—eventually
reversed their policies excluding gays and lesbians.161
Further, Obergefell signals that classifications based on sexual orientation
157
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See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (invalidating local “hate speech” ordinance). For critical analysis of the expressive and equality values implicated by hate speech regulation, see, for example, JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012); RICHARD
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND
THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 134–35 (1982).
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394 (holding that governments cannot single out for regulation “messages
of racial, gender, or religious intolerance”).
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in LEE C. BOLLINGER & GEOFFREY R.
STONE, ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (2002) (noting the popularity and influence of the First Amendment—particularly the free speech guarantee—in American
social, political, and legal cultures).
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996) (applying rational basis scrutiny to a Colorado constitutional amendment that discriminated against gay men and lesbians).
See Erik Eckholm, Boy Scouts End Ban on Gay Leaders, Over Protests by Mormon Church, N.Y. TIMES, Jul.
27, 2015, at A1.
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might receive more rigorous scrutiny in some cases.162 Litigants and activists will continue to examine and test the boundaries of the First Amendment right to exclude.163 Courts will elaborate this right, and the relationship between expressive and equality rights, in future cases. And all of this
will occur against a backdrop of changing cultural, political, and legal influences regarding the rights of gay men, lesbians, and other minorities.
Civil rights and equality activists fought for and obtained expressive
rights that protected and facilitated political mobilization on behalf of equal
protection. These rights later enabled organizations opposed to inclusion
to preserve what they considered an important form of organizational and
expressive autonomy. In turn, these new invocations of expressive rights
gave rise to dynamic elaboration in the courts—both of expressive rights
and of the relationship between expressive and equality rights. A new
phase of tension and conflict changed the tenor and substance of this relationship. This is generally what Rights Dynamism and dynamic elaboration look like as they occur on the ground.
4. Bi-Directional Elaboration
Rights Dynamism leads to dynamic elaboration of constitutional rights.
Over time, as rights intersect and find themselves in conversation with varying degrees of frequency, the meanings of individual textual provisions are
elaborated. This elaboration is bi-directional, in the sense that the meanings of both rights in the relationship are affected by their interactions.
Dynamic forces also affect interpretations and understandings of the relationships between rights.
We have already seen how understandings of the Due Process Clause
and Equal Protection Clause have been affected by their intermittent intersections.164 In the case of freedom of speech and equal protection rights, the
bi-directional effects are even clearer and stronger. Indeed, owing to the
frequency and significance of their interactions, we cannot fully understand
modern conceptions of either Equal Protection Clause or First Amendment
rights without reference to the dynamic intersection between them.
Early movement cases involving African-Americans, gay men, and lesbians established what I have called a right of “expressive equality.”165 The
combination of freedom of speech and equal protection requires, at a min-
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Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (stating that gay men and lesbians are entitled
to “the full promise of liberty”).
See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (rejecting the claim
that application of an anti-discrimination law to compel a photographer to render services to a
gay couple violated First Amendment).
See supra Part II.A.
See Zick, supra note 10, at 18–21.
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imum, that individuals be granted basic rights to speak, associate, and publish information. This is a more limited form of equality than civil rights
advocates wished to obtain. Nevertheless, it was an important antecedent
to a more robust conception of equal treatment under law. Expressive
equality protected the rights of despised minorities to do what others were
freely able to do under the law’s protection—to express identity, to openly
criticize government, to assemble together, and to disseminate information.
Expressive equality has been an important precursor to substantive
equality. Indeed, without expressive rights, some equality claims would
have been significantly delayed or perhaps even denied altogether. Absent
public agitation, judicial and legislative elaboration of racial equality rights
would have been suppressed or stymied. Some equality rights have sprung
from or originated in free speech principles and concepts. Thus, in the
opening lines of the decision in Obergefell, the Supreme Court observed that
the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause protect “a liberty that
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to
define and express their identity.”166 The passage recognizes a special link between expressive equality and substantive equality. The right to freely define and express one’s sexual identity is a right grounded in equal protection principles.
More generally, early claims by civil rights advocates established that
equal protection provided an effective and independent ground for challenging certain forms of expressive discrimination. Through this aspect of
the dynamic intersection of equality and free speech or expression we
learned that a central function of equality rights is to police and remedy
discriminatory classifications of all types. As noted earlier, equal protection
doctrine now does this largely through skeptical review of suspect and quasi-suspect classifications, with rationality review applied to socio-economic
classifications. As the intersection with expressive claims demonstrated,
however, equality rights and expressive rights serve the same basic function
of imposing formal neutrality requirements on government.
At the same time, contemporary understandings of the First Amendment’s expressive guarantees—particularly freedom of speech and expressive association—can be traced to equality advocates’ invocation of expressive rights and to equality principles more generally. The frequent
interactions of the free speech and equality guarantees have profoundly
shaped contemporary understandings of the First Amendment.
As Harry Kalven, Jr. observed, the race equality movement worked
profound changes in the law of free speech, press, privacy, and association.
As Kalven presciently stated: “[W]e may come to see the Negro as winning
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Obergefell, 129 S. Ct. at 2593 (emphasis added).
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back for us the freedom the Communists seem to have lost for us.”167 Kalven was referring to a series of early free speech cases in which the convictions of radicals, anarchists, and communists who had advocated overthrow
of government had been upheld by the Supreme Court.168 During the
Warren Court era, by contrast, the Supreme Court frequently ruled in favor of civil rights activists who were engaged in peaceful public protests and
other forms of equality agitation.169
Over time, civil rights precedents would become part of the First
Amendment’s bedrock. Free speech precedents expanded access to public
fora, protected robust criticism of government officials, imposed rigorous
content-neutrality and anti-orthodoxy principles, and established strong associative rights.170 The rights recognized in these cases have been invoked
not only by subsequent equality movements, but also by a long and everexpanding list of political, social, and cultural dissenters.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the judicial, political, and cultural attention to equality rights ultimately influenced the Supreme Court to interpret
the Free Speech Clause as including a “neutrality” principle.171 As we have
seen, during the civil rights era content neutrality rules became a central
component of the modern conception of freedom of speech. The free
speech neutrality principle revolutionized free speech doctrine by importing
equality values into the Free Speech Clause.172
As a result of their dynamic intersection with equality rights, we have also learned something about the limits of the Free Speech Clause. For example, civil rights advocates successfully invoked the Due Process Clause,
not the Free Speech Clause, to negate the use of trespass laws to remove
African-Americans from lunch counters and other public places.173 Decades later, courts similarly rejected First Amendment challenges by gay
men and lesbians to discriminatory employment dismissals and enforce167
168
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KALVEN, supra note 19, at 7.
See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951).
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 544–45 (1965) (invalidating the conviction of a leader of
a civil rights group seeking to protest racial segregation); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229, 235 (1963).
See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966) (invalidating a conviction for disturbing the
peace based on the free speech right to be present in a public library reading room); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (observing that debate regarding matters of public concern, including commentary on the behavior of public officials, should be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (recognizing the right of anonymous association).
See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26
(1975) (observing that there is a “principle of equal liberty of expression . . . inherent in the first
amendment”); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV.
233, 274–80 (noting a similar connection).
I should note that not all commentators have greeted this as a salutary event. See, e.g., Robert C.
Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997).
See KALVEN, supra note 19, Ch. 3 (discussing free speech claims in sit-in cases).
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ment of the U.S. military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell regulations.174 During
the early phases of the LGBT equality movement, First Amendment doctrines relating to sexually explicit speech sometimes failed to protect forms
of sexual dissent.175 These cases and conflicts suggested that despite its
strong legal and moral force, the Free Speech Clause, as interpreted, did
not protect all forms of equality speech.
Further, as discussed earlier, the LGBT experience indicated that First
Amendment rights can be invoked for defensive and exclusionary purposes.
The Supreme Court recognized a right not to associate, at least for certain
expressive organizations. As articulated by the Court, this right not to associate is potentially broad enough to threaten many anti-discrimination
laws.176 The exclusionary right of expressive association, which was recognized in cases involving exclusion of gay men and lesbians, could have farreaching effects across a range of disadvantaged classes. At the same time,
the right to exclude based on expressive grounds is critically important to
individual and organizational autonomy.177
Rights Dynamism has also revealed something about the relative
weights or values of First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court held that officials could not
single out derogatory words or actions for punishment—even if they were
part of a category of expression that was not covered by the First Amendment.178 R.A.V. reaffirms the First Amendment’s strong content-neutrality
requirement. However, the Court’s ruling was also a direct response to the
city’s claim that protection of racial dignity and equality deserve special
protection. R.A.V.’s holding elaborates a principle under which expressive
rights cannot be sacrificed to equality or dignity interests. The decision
could have broad consequences with regard to future efforts to regulate
threats, fighting words, libel, and other harmful speech.179
In sum, Rights Dynamism is a process in which constitutional rights are
174
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See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (overturning a
damages award for a bisexual employee terminated for disclosing the nature of her sexuality);
Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 853–57 (D. Md. 1973), aff’d, 359 F.3d 498 (4th
Cir. 1974) (upholding dismissal of a public school teacher who disclosed that he was gay and
commented in the media on his subsequent dismissal); supra note 112.
See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 772 (1977) (applying liberal interpretation of obscenity law to
regulation of “lesbianism, and sadism and masochism”); ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, at 203 (arguing
that “Miller’s [obscenity] framework has encouraged censorship of harmless gay pornography
while allowing violently misogynistic straight pornography.”).
See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 440 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (rejecting
an argument by a wedding photographer who refused service to a gay couple that application of
state anti-discrimination laws violated her First Amendment speech and association rights).
See generally INAZU, supra note 22.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992).
See Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and
Protected Expression in Anti-abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 553 (1996).
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elaborated over time, partly as a consequence of their frequent intersection.
This elaboration is bi-directional. Thus, we must ask not only what expressive
rights have done for equality rights, but also what equality agitation has done to
expressive rights. More generally, we cannot fully understand the modern
scope, recognition, and protection of either equal protection or freedom of
expression without accounting for their frequent intersections across time.
C. Freedom of Expression and Free Exercise of Religion
The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and Free Exercise Clause
have frequently intersected. These rights have greatly facilitated, reinforced, and illuminated one another.180 However, over a long period of
time, Rights Dynamism has produced significant changes in their relationship. Most notably, in some respects the Free Speech Clause has come to
dominate and subordinate the Free Exercise Clause. This has led some
commentators to wonder whether the Free Exercise Clause might now be
“redundant.”181 As with the other relationships, this one is multidimensional. The intersection between freedom of speech and free exercise
of religion has affected interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and, to a
lesser extent, the Establishment Clause. It has also influenced the articulation of a number of expressive concepts, doctrines, and principles.
1. Early Synergy and Mutual Illumination
The origins of the free speech-free exercise intersection can be traced to
pre-ratification practices and concepts.182 Religious adherents have always
relied heavily on free speech and free press activities to proselytize and
practice religion.183 Ultimately, the Constitution’s Framers provided overlapping, yet distinctive, protections for both expressive and religious rights.
Although expressive guarantees are broader in scope, freedoms of belief,
conscience, and expression are covered by both provisions.
As in other cases, the Framers did not make explicit—either in their deliberations or the text itself—what the relationship between these rights was
or ought to be. Like others discussed in this Article, the relationship between free speech and free exercise rights has largely been worked out over
time, through the process of Rights Dynamism. In the modern era, the
process began during the 1930s and 1940s, when Jehovah’s Witnesses
180
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See John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 791
(2014) (“The First Amendment’s freedoms of speech, press, religion, and assembly once reinforced each other.”).
See Tushnet, supra note 84, at 73 (2001) (“Contemporary constitutional doctrine may render the
Free Exercise Clause redundant.”).
See McConnell, supra note 59.
Yoder, supra note 59.
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brought a raft of constitutional challenges to restrictions on proselytizing,
soliciting, and other public activities.184 America was becoming more pluralistic in terms of faiths and religious practices. The Witnesses were frequently targeted and discriminated against by forces that saw religious pluralism as a threat to American culture.
The Witnesses did something fateful in terms of litigation strategy.
They brought cumulative claims, in which they typically invoked free expression (speech, press, and assembly) and free exercise rights.185 These
claims provided the Supreme Court with an early opportunity to consider
both the independent substance and relational qualities of these rights.
The Hughes Court responded, in part, by labeling both expressive and
free exercise rights “fundamental” and “preferred.”186 Thus, from an early
point in their jurisprudential relationship, the Court treated freedom of
speech and free exercise of religion as critical individual rights and components of a powerful framework for individual liberty.
Not much is known about the internal dynamics of the Hughes Court,
including its consideration of early free expression and free exercise cases.187 As Rights Dynamism suggests, the Court’s understanding of the relationship between these rights appears to have evolved over time.
In the first few cases, the Supreme Court did not even address independent free exercise claims that had been raised along with free speech
and free press claims.188 However, as the Witnesses continued to pursue
their agenda in the courts, the Court gradually began to separately address
some of the free exercise claims.189 This led to early interpretations of both
Clauses and of the relationship between them.
What emerged was a synergistic and bi-directional rights relationship,
similar in many respects to others we have considered. Although it frequently grounded its decisions in free speech and other expressive principles, the
Hughes Court also articulated the core substance of what would later become
modern free exercise rights. And, of course, the Court handed down some of
the earliest interpretations of free speech and other expressive rights.
Applying free speech principles, the Hughes Court concluded that religious
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For a description of the cases, see Feldman, supra note 65, at 443–51; Hildebrand, supra note 33,
at 150–59.
See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (“Freedom of press, freedom of speech,
freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”).
Court records from this era have only recently been made available. See Barry Cushman, The
Hughes Court Docket Books: The Early Terms, 1929–1933, 40 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 103 (2015).
See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938).
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
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adherents had a right to access the streets, a public resource, on equal terms
and for the express purpose of exercising religion.190 The Court also shielded
religious proselytizing and recruiting from a variety of repressive state and local
laws.191 It barred government from discriminating against or targeting religion
or religious practices, invalidated prior restraints on religious exercise, and invalidated tax schemes that effectively suppressed religious practices.192
Even when the grounds for decision were based on expressive doctrines
or concepts, the Hughes Court simultaneously elaborated the broad contours of religious liberty under the Free Exercise and, to a lesser extent, the
Establishment Clause. Thus, when it granted religious adherents access to
public streets based upon freedom of speech and assembly principles, the
Court established that religious observers were entitled to enjoy at least some
public resources on an equal basis.193 Applying free speech principles, the
Court observed that religious adherents were not generally entitled to exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws such as content-neutral
permit requirements.194 At the same time, the Court held that government
was prohibited from discriminating against religion or singling it out for special burdens.195 The Court held that governments were prohibited from
imposing unconstitutional conditions—i.e., forcing one to choose between
practicing a chosen religion and receiving government resources—on religious adherents.196 Finally, it ruled that government officials were not empowered to determine whether a religious belief was sincere, or whether an
activity in some sense “counted” as religious in its nature or purpose.197
Many decades later, after much doctrinal churn, these early interpretations would become central premises of the modern Free Exercise Clause. To
be sure, the Hughes Court did not fully elaborate all Religion Clauses doctrines. However, as it processed cumulative expressive and religious claims,
the Court began to articulate the basic outlines of the scope of religious freedom in the nascent regulatory state. Although expressive rights were the primary vehicle for this early elaboration, the recognition and enforcement of
expressive rights—rights to access public resources, protections against discrimination, etc.—benefitted and illuminated religious rights as well.
As the discussion suggests, the relationship between these rights has always been bi-directional. I have explained how free expression principles
190
191
192
193
194
195
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See, e.g., Schneider, 301 U.S. at 160 (holding that municipality had to allow religious speakers to
access public streets on equal terms with other speakers).
See Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451 (invalidating restrictions on distribution of literature in public places).
See, e.g., Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307–08 (invalidating solicitation ban on free exercise grounds); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576 (1944) (invalidating tax on religious activities).
Schneider, 301 U.S. at 160.
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
Id. at 307.
Id.
See id. at 305–06.
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and doctrines led to early interpretations of religious freedoms. The early
dynamic between freedom of expression and free exercise of religion had
an even more pronounced effect on expressive doctrines and principles.198
Most of the fundamental concepts and principles of modern free speech
doctrine were first articulated during the 1930s and 1940s, in the Witnesses
cases. Indeed, it may only be a slight exaggeration to say that one could
teach nearly all of the fundamental principles of modern freedom of expression doctrine through the early Hughes Court decisions.
For example, efforts to suppress religious expression and practices
helped the Court identify and elaborate central Free Speech Clause concepts. Prior to the Witnesses cases, courts had generally adopted the view
that public streets and parks were under the exclusive and plenary control
of the governments that held title to them.199 However, starting in the
1930s, the Court began to recognize that “public forum” properties such as
public streets had “immemorially” been open to the public for the purpose
of expressive activities and were held in trust by government for the benefit
of all speakers.200 Through their challenges to restrictions on the ability to
distribute literature and otherwise engage with citizens in the public streets,
the Witnesses forged the first real breathing space for public debate and information flow in public places.201 Decades later, the civil rights movement
and many other causes would rely heavily on the principles and precedents
of this early dynamic.
In its rulings striking down solicitation bans, discriminatory license taxes, prior restraints, and permit schemes, the Hughes Court emphasized that
all speakers, including religious ones, had a right to access public streets and
parks.202 The Court allowed state and local governments to regulate the
time, place, and manner of expression and to attend to other public order
concerns.203 However, it struck down facially discriminatory laws, permit
schemes that were based upon the unbridled discretion of public officials,
and discriminatory taxes and penalties.204 The Court also indicated that
some speech is not covered, as a categorical matter, by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause—thus anticipating the modern categorical approach to free speech coverage.205 Finally, the Court held that officials
198
199
200
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See Hildebrand, supra note 33, at 133 (observing “that a coherent First Amendment tradition honoring the centrality of rich public debate began as early as the 1930s . . . .”).
See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
See Schneider v. New Jersey, 301 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (observing that “the streets are natural and
proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion”).
See Hildebrand, supra note 33, at 156–58.
See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (discussing the “fighting words” category).
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could not suppress speech merely because it offended a public audience.206
And there was much more to these precedents in terms of elaboration
of expressive rights. With regard to freedom of speech and press, the early
Hughes Court decisions also: (1) held that speech restrictions based on the
content of speech or the identity of the speaker were presumptively unconstitutional;207 (2) recognized a First Amendment right of willing audiences
to receive information;208 (3) held that audiences who were captive in their
homes had the right to decide whether to receive unwanted expression;209
(4) recognized that even false statements of fact could be valuable to public
debate;210 (5) rejected governmental efforts to characterize speech as
“commercial,” and thus outside the First Amendment’s coverage, on the
ground that the publisher might receive some remuneration for her materials;211 and (6) held that the Free Speech Clause protects a right not to speak
or be compelled to communicate.212 All of these concepts and principles
are now central aspects of contemporary First Amendment doctrine.
As importantly, the discriminatory treatment and explicit exclusion of religious speakers encouraged the Court to think about the reasons or justifications for protecting expressive rights. Long before the Warren Court made
its storied turn toward liberal protection for free speech rights, the Hughes
Court drew connections between public religious speech and concepts such
as the marketplace of ideas and democratic self-government.213 The Court
also recognized the autonomy interests of religious speakers, and the importance to individual self-fulfillment of communicating religious ideas.214
The product of this deliberation appeared explicitly in the Court’s deci-
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See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310 (noting that there was no assault or threat of bodily harm or abuse,
but only an effort to persuade the listener).
See Schneider v. New Jersey, 301 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (discussing prohibition on suppression of
certain views).
See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (noting how freedom to distribute information “necessarily protects the right to receive it”).
See id. at 147 (noting that householders have “the full right to decide whether [they] will receive
strangers as visitors”).
See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310 (noting that speakers sometimes resort “even to false statement” in
political and religious debates).
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (noting that the prohibition was permissible because
the money contained an invitation to contribute to the support of purchasing books).
W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (declaring that the Free Speech
Clause invalidates government efforts to compel individuals to communicate official orthodoxies).
See e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing
marketplace justifications for free speech); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 3 (1948) (articulating a theory of self-government focused on
political speech).
See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310 (“The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under their
shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed.”).
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sion in Cantwell v. Connecticut,215 which invalidated—on both free speech and
free exercise grounds—a permit scheme targeting religious solicitation. The
Court stated:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the
pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men
who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false
statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties
are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on
the part of the citizens of a democracy.216

In general, the Hughes Court decisions reflect an appreciation both for
the independent significance of distinctive expressive and religious rights as
well as for their potential to mutually reinforce and illuminate one another.
The Court often relied exclusively on expressive claims.217 This explains
why the cases from this early era are typically regarded as important precedents concerning First Amendment free speech, free press, and assembly
rights. However, as I have shown, the decisions were also critical to the
recognition and interpretation of free exercise rights. In addition to recognizing First Amendment rights as fundamental and “preferred,” the Court
interpreted them in a manner that highlighted their synergistic and collaborative relationship. Similar to the expression-equality dynamic, recognition
and enforcement of expressive rights created public breathing space for the
free exercise of religion. In turn, recognition of free exercise rights helped
to create a stronger foundation for expressive rights.
The early Witnesses cases highlighted the commonalities and synergies
between fundamental and “preferred” free speech and free exercise rights.
Separately and together, these individual rights forged a strong framework
for constitutional liberty. As the Court considered claims based on both
expressive and free exercise rights, it began to elaborate doctrines and principles in both areas. This process of elaboration would continue in subsequent decades. However, as governments and religious adherents absorbed
the lessons of the initial intersection, and as social, political, and legal circumstances changed, the relationship between freedom of expression and
free exercise rights would undergo some important changes.
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Id. at 300–01 (1940) (invalidating statute on free speech an exercise grounds).
Id. at 310.
See Feldman, supra note 65, at 448 (observing that the Hughes Court typically relied on expressive
grounds).

May 2017]

RIGHTS DYNAMISM

837

2. A Preference for Expressive Rights and Rationales
Although it elaborated both free expression and free exercise principles
in early cases, the Hughes Court generally preferred to ground decisions in
free speech and press principles rather than free exercise rationales. As
noted earlier, the Hughes Court rarely analyzed free exercise claims independently. The most common disposition was to hold that the statute or
ordinance being challenged violated freedom of speech, press, and religion,
with little or no separate consideration given to the free exercise claim.218
Even Cantwell, which involved the Hughes Court’s most specific analysis of
a freestanding free exercise claim, appeared to rest primarily on free speech
and free press principles relating to prior restraints and state censorship.219
Thus, although the Court was fleshing out both expressive and free exercise
rights and highlighting synergies between them, in terms of its explications
freedom of expression was already doing the lion’s share of the work.
Commentators have suggested that the Hughes Court favored or “preferred” free speech rights over free exercise rights, and that this preference
was rooted in external social and political changes.220 For instance, Stephen
Feldman has argued that the transformation of American democracy in the
1920s and 1930s, from a republican to a more pluralistic system, helps to explain why the Court typically granted relief based on free speech rather than
free exercise rationales.221 According to Feldman, the Justices may have perceived the Witnesses’ religious liberty claims as being in tension with American democratic ideals.222 He suggested that the mostly Protestant jurists may
have viewed the Witnesses as “outsiders” pursuing special religious rights, rather than broad-based democratic values like those at the core of freedom of
speech and press.223 As Feldman summarized his argument:
One reason, then, that the Protestant-controlled Supreme Court favored
free expression over religious freedom during the 1930s and 1940s was that
the religious freedom claims were more likely than the free expression
claims to intensify the salience of the Justices’ separation from the claimants as outsiders.224

As noted, we still know very little about the Hughes Court’s internal de-
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Id. at 448 (“Without the support of free expression, a religious freedom claim inevitably failed.”).
See ERIC MICHAEL MAZUR, THE AMERICANIZATION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES:
CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 30 (1999) (offering a similar interpretation of
Cantwell).
See e.g., Feldman, supra note 65, at 477 (noting that the Court often linked free expression and religious freedom).
See id. at 432 (arguing that “the transition from republican to pluralist democracy practically
turned the First Amendment concepts of free expression and religious freedom on their heads”).
Id. at 455 (arguing that free expression is integral to democracy and the democratic process but
religious freedom is not).
Id. at 470 (describing the Witnesses as “religious outsiders” in the context of free expression).
Id. at 473.
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liberations.225 In terms of Rights Dynamism, it is certainly possible that social and political conceptions of pluralism and democracy partially shaped
the Court’s approach to the cumulative rights claims before them. However, as discussed earlier, the Hughes Court adopted a constitutional framework that actually extended significant protections to both freedom of expression and free exercise of religion. Even when it did not rest decisions
explicitly on free exercise grounds, the Court reasoned in a way that suggested a synergy and collaboration between expressive and religious liberties. At the least, in most cases, ruling in favor of expressive rights significantly facilitated the Witnesses’ free exercise rights as well. Although
Feldman’s thesis might help to explain a “preference” for expressive
frameworks and principles, the Hughes Court was hardly anti-free exercise.
Nevertheless, it is true that the Hughes Court generally preferred to explain
its rulings in expressive terms. Rights Dynamism suggests some additional or
perhaps alternative explanations for this early and ultimately fateful preference.
For one thing, the activities in question—speaking, distributing literature, soliciting, and gathering in public—very closely resembled speech,
press, and assembly activities. In this sense, as a matter of both conceptual
familiarity and historical experience, the Witnesses’ grievances were the
natural province of the First Amendment’s free speech, press, and assembly
guarantees. By the 1930s, public streets had already been the focus of free
speech battles involving labor agitators, political dissenters, and others.226
The Witnesses’ claims were a natural extension of the fundamental issue
raised by these early conflicts—namely, whether government had the authority to declare public streets and other venues speech-free zones. In
terms of its own agenda, the Hughes Court’s primary goal may have been
to address the matter of speakers’ access to the public forum generally rather than to articulate religious rights.
Further, at this very early stage, cross-doctrinal issues may have affected
the preference for expressive frameworks and rationales. When the Hughes
Court first encountered the Witnesses’ claims, the Free Exercise Clause had
been interpreted quite narrowly—principally as a protection for religious
beliefs rather than religious activities.227 The extent to which the free exercise guarantee extended beyond conscience and belief was at that point unclear. By contrast, even at this early stage, it was clear that the Free Speech
Clause extended to at least some expressive conduct.228 Moreover, the
Court had issued several decisions under the Free Speech Clause protecting
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See Cushman, supra note 187.
See generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1999).
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878) (holding that religious beliefs cannot be
superior to the law of the land).
See e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1931) (invalidating a flag desecration law).
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offensive solicitation and proselytizing.229 Expressive rights claims were
thus both more familiar and better established than their Free Exercise
Clause counterparts.
In sum, as Rights Dynamism posits, a multitude of factors—the litigation strategies of claimants, the nature and substance of their claims, the
identity of the claimants, judicial attitudes and agendas, societal and political influences, and doctrinal developments—all likely influenced the
Court’s earliest approach to the relationship between expressive and free
exercise rights. For a variety of reasons, in the beginning the Court was
more comfortable communicating its rulings in expressive terms. Later,
that comfort would morph into something else—the substitution of free
speech rights for religious free exercise rights.
3. Subordinating the Free Exercise Clause
As we have seen, rights relationships change over the course of time.
Rights dynamics are affected by many influences and forces, both within
and outside the judicial branch. By the early 1980s, the relationship between freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion was undergoing a
significant transformation. During the next phase of the relationship, the
Free Speech Clause would become the dominant partner in the relationship. In fact, the subordination of free exercise rights to free speech rights
would lead some commentators to wonder whether the Free Exercise
Clause had essentially become “redundant.”230
Beginning in the 1980s, religious adherents began once again to turn to
the Free Speech Clause—this time, mainly in challenges to what they alleged were discriminatory exclusions from public facilities and subsidies.
Concerns about separation of church and state had led some localities to
adopt policies that singled out religious adherents for exclusion. In response, like civil rights advocates during the 1950s and 1960s, during the
1980s and 1990s religious liberty activists turned to the courts for relief.
In deciding the equal access cases, the Rehnquist Court relied exclusively
on the Free Speech Clause—even when the Free Exercise Clause was also
invoked, and even where free exercise was an equally plausible ground for
decision.231 To be sure, during the equal access era, some litigants still pur229
230
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See e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 259 (1941) (holding that courts generally may not
hold speakers in contempt for commenting on pending litigation and criticizing judges).
See Tushnet, supra note 84.
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 121 (2001) (challenging restrictions on
religious proselytizing on Free Speech Clause grounds); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995) (same); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 400 (1993) (same); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (challenging exclusion
on Free Speech Clause grounds); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981) (same); see also Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech
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sued cumulative free speech and free exercise claims. But for a number of
reasons, religious adherents came increasingly to rely on free speech claims
to the eventual exclusion of free exercise claims. By the 1990s, the Hughes
Court preference for rationalizing decisions involving both free exercise
and free speech claims in expressive terms had been replaced by full reliance on the Free Speech Clause—even where the central claim involved
explicit discrimination against religious adherents.
The dynamics that brought about this transformation were complex
and multi-faceted. One important shift occurred at the level of constitutional advocacy. Beginning in the 1980s, religious liberty activists began to
pursue a strategic litigation agenda that facilitated religious rights through
free speech claims.232 As one student of this strategy explained: “After several years of frustrating losses in the courts arguing the religion clauses,
New Christian Right lawyers turned to the free speech clause with a vengeance in the late 1980s.”233
The free speech strategy, which was borrowed from civil rights, labor,
and other movements, was both a reaction to what religious liberty advocates perceivd as the public marginalzation of religion and a means of protecting religious proselytization from governmental suppression.234 The
free speech strategy was no secret. Indeed, leaders of the religious liberty
movement publicly touted it. As one of the principal architects of the strategy commented: “[T]he free speech strategy has proven effective with
judges across the ideological spectrum against opponents who rely on the
First Amendment’s clause against the establishment of religion.”235
As this statement suggests, the legal strategy was driven in part by doctrinal concerns relating to the religion clauses—in particular, the Establishment Clause, which prohibited government from aiding religion in certain ways.236 Free speech claims appeared to avoid or sidestep possible
Establishment Clause complications associated with providing public benefits to religious adherents. Under the free speech rationale, religious adherents were merely demanding equal treatment as speakers—not special benefits as religious persons or institutions. This approach was more attractive
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Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 131–33 (2002) (observing that equal access restrictions plainly violated the Free Exercise Clause).
See generally STEVEN P. BROWN, TRUMPING RELIGION: THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT, THE FREE
SPEECH CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS (2002) (examining Christian Right’s free speech litigation
strategy).
Id. at 58.
See id. at 59.
Gustav Niebuhr, Conservatives’ New Frontier: Religious Liberty Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/08/us/conservatives-new-frontier-religious-liberty-lawfirms.html?pagewanted=all.
See BROWN, supra note 232, at 67–74 (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of the relationship among the Free Speech Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Establishment Clause).
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to judges across the ideological spectrum.
Developments in free speech doctrine also help to explain the dynamic
that led to a strong turn in the direction of the Free Speech Clause. In the
decades between the Hughes Court’s decisions and the Rehnquist Court’s
re-consideration of the free speech-free exercise relationship, free speech
doctrine had become far more stable and robust relative to free exercise
doctrine. Thus, by the 1980s, the Court had developed the core of its public forum doctrine, which extended free speech protections to public properties other than public streets and parks.237 Further, aided in part by an
abundance of academic commentary on free speech doctrine and theory,
the Court had elaborated strong content-neutrality rules.238
Under free speech doctrine as it stood in the 1980s, laws and regulations that discriminated based on the content of speech were subject to
strict scrutiny and were presumptively invalid.239 Moreover, as interpreted,
the Free Speech Clause was capacious enough to encompass not only religious discussions but perhaps too a great many religious practices. These
broad free speech protections had assisted speakers seeking access to a wide
variety of public properties and programs. In sum, between the Hughes
Court’s minimal access decisions and the Rehnquist Court’s equal access
decisions, the Free Speech Clause had become an increasingly robust and
reliable guarantee of equal access and equal treatment for all speakers.
In contrast, by the 1980s, the Court’s free exercise framework, which
purported to apply heightened scrutiny even to laws that incidentally burdened religious beliefs or practices, was considered by some to be unworkable and unstable.240 Moreover, the Court’s decisions striking down school
prayer and certain public religious displays suggested that at least some religious speech was not covered by the Free Exercise Clause and/or might be
barred by the Establishment Clause.241
The Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which held
that religious adherents were not entitled to constitutional exemptions from
neutral and generally applicable laws, suggested a considerable weakening
of the Free Exercise Clause as a guarantor of equal access and equal treatment.242 Although the Court clarified after Smith that explicit forms of discrimination against religion could still be challenged under the Free Exer237
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See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (summarizing public forum doctrine).
See e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189,
196 (1983).
See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461–63 (1980).
See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 42 (2007) (observing that courts were not actually applying strict scrutiny in religious rights cases).
See e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424–25 (1962) (invalidating state-imposed official prayers).
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
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cise Clause, the scope of constitutional free exercise rights appeared to be
narrower and somewhat uncertain relative to free speech protections.243
Note that Smith was an important event in the free speech turn, but does
not fully explain it. Reliance on the Free Speech Clause started very early
in the Rehnquist Court era—in some instances, well before Smith was decided. In some cases, religious adherents abandoned seemingly viable free
exercise claims in favor of the Free Speech Clause.244
Nevertheless, Smith certainly added to the appeal of a free speech strategy already being embraced by religious freedom advocates. Once religious
adherents began to win equal access cases in the Supreme Court on free
speech grounds, the die was effectively cast. Even in cases where a Free
Exercise Clause claim was viable and indeed supported heightened scrutiny—i.e., where the government expressly targeted religion for exclusion—
religious adherents litigated claims based on the Free Speech Clause rather
than the Free Exercise Clause.245
Internal Court dynamics, including judicial agenda-setting, may also
have influenced the turn toward the Free Speech Clause. Reliance on the
Free Speech Clause resulted in constitutional protection for both freedom of
speech and the free exercise of religion. Moreover, it allowed the Court to
extract itself somewhat from difficult questions regarding the scope of the
Free Exercise Clause—not to mention, as indicated earlier, the implications
under the Establishment Clause of granting religious adherents access to
public places and funds.
From this perspective, the Rehnquist Court cleverly positioned itself as
a champion of freedom of speech that also protected the participatory and
other rights of religious adherents. Moreover, the Free Speech Clause focus may have been attractive as a partial antidote to religious adherents’
concerns in the wake of Smith. Their success in public forum and free
speech cases deflected charges that the Supreme Court was hostile or insensitive to religious adherents’ rights, or that the Constitution no longer protected religious rights in any meaningful way. Granting equal access to religious adherents was not the same thing as granting religious
accommodations—i.e., exemptions from generally applicable laws. Religious adherents would gain some of that ground back under federal and
state religious freedom laws.246 However, in the short term, granting access
243
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See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (invalidating a law targeting a religious group’s central practice, animal sacrifice, under the test articulated in Smith).
See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652–54 (1981) (discussing abandonment of free exercise claim and relying on Free Speech Clause framework).
See Brownstein, supra note 231, at 129–133 (observing that all of the challenged laws in the equal
access cases targeted religion for discriminatory treatment).
See e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4; Religious
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to religious speakers under the Free Speech Clause facilitated religious participation in public programs and public life.
All of these external and internal dynamics pointed toward increased
and, ultimately, exclusive reliance on the Free Speech Clause in equal access cases. By the end of the 1990s, the Free Exercise Clause had effectively
been supplanted by the Free Speech Clause. In the Rehnquist Court’s
1990s equal access cases, the Free Exercise Clause was not even cited as a
supporting provision, much less an independent basis for decision.
4. Multi-Directional Elaboration
In many respects, the dynamics in the free speech-free exercise relationship have tracked those in other rights relationships. For example, freedom
of speech and other expressive rights have obviously facilitated the free exercise of religion. The frequent intersection of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion has influenced our understanding of both guarantees.
However, this particular rights relationship has also been distinctive in some
respects. The extent to which the Free Speech Clause has displaced the Free
Exercise Clause is one important distinction. Moreover, unlike the other relationships under consideration, the presence of a third clause—the Establishment Clause—also has to be accounted for.247 In this particular context,
the relationship has produced some multi-directional elaboration of freedom
of speech, free exercise, and establishment principles. Insofar as religious
rights are concerned, the dynamic intersection between freedom of speech
and free exercise has generated both synergy and redundancy. As discussed
below, it has also created complications like “hybrid” free exercise claims.
Freedom of speech has also been significantly affected by this intersection.
As the decisions of the Hughes Court showed, when rights relate in synergistic and collaborative ways they can illuminate and strengthen one another. As I explained earlier, the intersection between freedom of expression and free exercise of religion during the 1930s and 1940s led to the
elaboration of core free exercise rights and produced much of the modern
framework for expressive rights. Although the Court clearly preferred to
articulate its decisions in expressive terms, it nevertheless elaborated upon
the relationship between First Amendment expressive and free exercise
rights in a manner that strengthened both guarantees. During this early
period, the Establishment Clause, whose meaning and implications were
not well understood, remained mostly in the background.
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Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (prohibiting state action imposing a substantial burden on an institutionalized person’s free exercise rights unless such action is
the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest).
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”).
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Decades later, a preference for expressive rationales was replaced with a
free speech supremacy framework in which the Free Exercise Clause largely
faded from view. The early synergy and collaboration between the clauses
also disappeared. Despite the virtual abandonment of the Free Exercise
Clause, some religious practices found shelter under the Free Speech Clause.
With the equal access victories, the Free Exercise Clause was effectively
subjugated to the Free Speech Clause. Under this approach, religious adherents became part of a homogenized mass of speakers, all claiming equal
access to public properties. Although they were protected from discriminatory exclusion on expressive grounds, religious adherents were not entitled
to any accommodations based on religious creeds, commands, or beliefs.
In other words, under free speech supremacy religious exercise is protected—but only insofar as it can be characterized and treated as religious expression. Like other speakers, religious adherents must demonstrate that
they are communicating some message that is likely to be understood by an
audience.248 The faith-based nature of religious practices, such as proselytizing and worship, is not relevant to this constitutional inquiry. Access is
granted not because of the special religious nature of these activities, but in
spite of their distinctive character.
Taken to its logical conclusion, this conception of free exercise-as-speech
would consolidate or merge two separate and distinct rights. Public forum
doctrines and free speech content-neutrality principles would crowd out consideration of the religious nature of practices and rituals. As noted, even
where the government expressly targets religion for discriminatory treatment,
the Free Exercise Clause has not been relied upon. If religion is merely
speech or speech acts, then the Free Exercise Clause is surplus language.249
This is not the only interpretive complication that has arisen at the intersection of freedom of speech and free exercise. When it narrowed the
free exercise guarantee, Smith also created a so-called “hybrid” rights
claim.250 The hybrid rights invention appears to save free exercise claims,
but only if they are attached to some other fundamental rights claim—such
as a claim that free speech rights have also been violated. Even assuming
that we are to take this invention seriously,251 in hybrid free expression-free
248
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See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974) (requiring for purposes of Free Speech
Clause coverage that a speaker intend to communicate a message through action and that an audience be likely to understand the message).
See Tushnet, supra note 84, at 72–73 (suggesting the limited scope of free exercise protection, coupled with the robust degree of free speech protection, renders the Free Exercise Clause redundant); cf. Inazu, supra note 180, at 789–90 (claiming the “unified distinctiveness” of the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly, press, and religion has been replaced by
an “undifferentiated free speech framework” that disadvantages the rights of private groups in
civil society).
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (recognizing “hybrid” rights).
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 89, at 1122 (criticizing the concept of “hybrid” rights).
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exercise claims, the Free Speech Clause again appears to be doing all of the
work. In this respect, hybrid claims are simply another vestige of the subordination of the Free Exercise Clause. In hybrid claims, a litigant without
an expressive claim (or some other fundamental rights claim) cannot vindicate her constitutional free exercise rights.
As noted, the relationship between free expression and free exercise has
affected a third provision—the Establishment Clause. Thus, in the course
of deciding the equal access cases, the Rehnquist Court indirectly elaborated upon aspects of the relationship among the Free Speech Clause and the
two Religion Clauses.
The interaction between freedom of speech and free exercise implicated,
and in some cases complicated, anti-establishment principles and baselines.
Those principles are notoriously complicated in their own right.252 In the
simplest terms, it does not violate the Establishment Clause when religious
adherents benefit from generally and neutrally available forms of public support.253 However, the Establishment Clause does impose some limitations on
official support for religion, including direct forms of financial aid.254
Using the First Amendment’s public forum doctrine, the Supreme
Court’s equal access cases adopted a very broad interpretation of permissible governmental subsidies for religion.255 Again, to simplify matters, if all
government programs that are open to a diversity of speakers and views are
treated as public fora, and if access to public fora is the sort of incidental
benefit to religion the Establishment Clause permits, then it would seem to
follow that any form of subsidy that can be characterized as a public forum
must be made available to religious as well as secular individuals.
This indeed was the Court’s reasoning in cases such as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,256 which invalidated the exclusion of
a religious student publication from a university’s student activities fund.
The exclusion of religion, said the Court, discriminated against religious editorial viewpoints and thus violated the rules relating to regulation of speech
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See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“[C]andor compels the
acknowledgment that we can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity in this sensitive area of constitutional adjudication.”).
See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (allowing a public school
district to provide a sign-language interpreter for a student at a Catholic high school under a federal program for the disabled).
See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973) (“In the
absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived from public funds will be
used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that
direct aid in whatever form is invalid.”).
See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391–93 (1993)
(analyzing access by a religious group to public school property under public forum doctrine).
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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in a limited public forum.257 The Court concluded that providing public
funds to the expressly religious publication would not violate the Establishment Clause.258 It reasoned that the student activities funding policy was
neutral with regard to religion, the religious speech would not be attributed
to the university, and no funds flowed directly to the religious organizations.259 The Court concluded that any benefit to religion from neutral access to the university’s public forum was merely an indirect benefit to religion and not an establishment of religion.260
In dissent, Justice Souter argued that the Court had, for the first time,
approved “funding of core religious activities by an arm of the State.”261
He claimed that the provision of student activities funds to a religious publication violated the rule that “direct aid to religion is impermissible.”262
Justice Souter also contended that the equal access precedents, which allowed access to speakers for traditional expressive activities in public fora,
could not be stretched to cover things like the provision of printing funds to
religious publications.263 The public forum cases, Justice Souter wrote,
“cannot be lifted to a higher plane of generalization without admitting that
new economic benefits are being extended directly to religion in clear violation of the principle barring direct aid.”264
Rosenberger suggested that under the free speech framework adopted in
the equal access cases, public forum doctrine had effectively become a new
Establishment Clause baseline. During the same term, in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,265 the Court held that the Ku Klux Klan
could erect a Latin cross in a public plaza next to the Ohio capitol building.
A plurality concluded that communication of private religious speech “cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it is (1) purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and
open to all on equal terms.”266 The plurality refused even to apply the Establishment Clause’s “endorsement” test, which asks whether a reasonable
observer would perceive the unattended cross as governmental support for
or favoritism toward religion.267
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Id. at 831.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 840–42.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 863 (Souter, J. dissenting).
Id. at 884–85.
Id. at 889.
Id.
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
Id. at 770 (emphasis added).
See id. at 768 (refusing to apply the endorsement test, arguing doing so would “disrupt the settled
principle that policies providing incidental benefits to religion do not contravene the Establishment Clause”).
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The Court’s injection and application of public forum principles
demonstrates how the interaction of free speech principles with the religion
clauses can result in new constructions of both. In Rosenberger, as in other
equal access cases, the Court essentially equated public forum principles
with establishment baselines. In Pinette, the Court was one vote shy of carving out a public forum exception for the Establishment Clause’s endorsement test.268 Reliance on the Free Speech Clause altered not just the relationship between freedom of speech and free exercise of religion, but also
the interplay among the First Amendment’s free speech, free exercise, and
establishment provisions.
As in other relationships, elaboration has occurred in more than one direction. I have discussed how religious rights have been affected by their interaction with the Free Speech Clause. But to a degree that has thus far been
underappreciated, the intersection has also significantly affected interpretations of the Free Speech Clause. While this has been true in many respects, I
will limit the discussion to a few of the most notable interpretive effects.
Four free speech or expressive complications are particularly noteworthy. First, religious speech cases have significantly affected judicial elaboration of the public forum doctrine. The early Hughes Court decisions, as
well as the Rehnquist Court equal access decisions, established and reaffirmed the core concept of the public forum and the requirement of content-neutrality within public fora.269 However, religious claimants were not
always successful in claiming access to public properties. As we have seen
in other contexts, invocation of the Free Speech Clause sometimes leads to
negative precedents.
For example, free speech claims involving proselytizing and soliciting in
public places have sometimes been denied, resulting in a possible narrowing
of public forum definitions and access rights. In cases involving Hare
Krishnas’ efforts to engage in religious solicitation, the Court has denied
access to some important public properties.270 These precedents have affected the free speech rights of a variety of speakers seeking access to similar
268
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In subsequent cases, the Court has refused to extend this public forum-establishment framework
to contexts in which no public forum is present or public forum principles are deemed out of
place. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 478–79 (2009) (holding a municipality
was permitted to select permanent monuments for a public park without regard to public forum
principles); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719–21 (2004) (holding the state was not required to
permit individuals to use public funds for religious education).
See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 109 (2001) (concluding that government had discriminated against religious group’s speech in a limited public forum based on
viewpoint); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (noting that religious speaker was
“upon a public street, where he had a right to be, and where he had a right peacefully to impart
his views to others”).
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (holding airport
terminals are not public fora); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 650 (1981) (holding fairground thoroughfares are not open expressive fora); .
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public properties.
To be sure, in other religious speech cases, the Court has recognized
“metaphysical” fora and described a “limited public forum” category that
at least facially appears to expand speakers’ access rights.271 However, in
application, these principles seem primarily to benefit religious speakers in
particular settings, as opposed to private speakers more generally.272
Further, owing in part to Establishment Clause concerns, in some religious speech cases the Court has determined that public forum principles
are “out of place” and do not apply at all—even, for example, in traditional
public fora such as public parks.273 In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Supreme Court held that although town officials had accepted a Ten Commandments monument for display in a public park they were not obligated
under the Free Speech Clause to accept another religious monument offered by a minority religion.274 The Court held that the government communicated through the monuments it accepted, and when it engaged in
communication rather than regulation it was not required to comply with
Free Speech Clause access and neutrality rules.275 The Court held that
public forum principles were not applicable—even though the place in
question was a public park.276
Thus, religious speech precedents have contributed both to the construction of the public forum doctrine and to some of its notable ambiguities, complications, and limitations. These effects are not uncommon when
rights intersect with one another. In dynamic elaboration, courts flesh out
rights relationships by means of the common law tradition. This often
leads to ad hoc and even unintended results.
Second, interpretive complications have arisen with regard to the conceptualization of religious speech. The Rehnquist Court’s equal access cases raised fundamental questions about the definition and concept of
“speech” itself. Some commentators have criticized the Court’s categorical
treatment of all forms of religious activity—solicitation, proselytizing, prayer, teaching, and perhaps even worship—as covered speech.277 Others
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See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (describing a
student activities fund as a “metaphysical” public forum).
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have taken issue with the Court’s insistence, in the equal access cases, that
the exclusion of religion or religious speech is always and necessarily a form
of viewpoint discrimination.278 Among other things, this insistence seems to
elevate religious speech above even political content, which can sometimes
be excluded from certain public fora.279 As with its public forum interpretations, the Court’s elaborations of “speech” and “viewpoint-neutrality” are
not confined to laws regulating religious speech. Thus, they may create potential complications in a variety of unforeseen contexts.
Third, the intersection between free speech and free exercise rights has
complicated, and in some cases limited, expressive association rights. In
CLS v. Martinez, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a state law school’s
requirement that the Christian Legal Society, which based membership decisions on certain creedal commitments, accept “all comers” into its organization.280 The Court concluded that the organization’s associational rights
effectively “merged” with its free speech rights, and applied public forum
doctrine to reject the free speech claim.281 In Martinez, free speech supremacy displaced not only free exercise rights but associational ones as well.282
Fourth, and finally, Summum shows how the intersection of religious
speech and public forum doctrine has contributed to the Court’s articulation of the principle of government speech. Although the Court has stated
that the Establishment Clause limits governmental communications to
some degree, it has been far less clear about whether there are other constitutional limits on government speech.283 Indeed, even the Establishment
Clause limitation is somewhat uncertain; in some contexts, it apparently
permits government officials to adopt sectarian monuments.284
These are just a few notable highlights, intended to demonstrate the kinds
of complications that can arise when free speech and free exercise rights intersect with one another. More generally, the discussion demonstrates that
intersections between constitutional rights can produce significant interpretive changes in many directions. The study of Rights Dynamism alters understandings of intersecting individual rights provisions and associated doc-
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See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 697 (1996) (“The core
of the Court’s opinion is unconvincing because it fails to elaborate a plausible account of what
constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”).
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302–04 (1974) (upholding a public transit
rule barring political advertisements from city bus advertising spaces, but allowing commercial
advertisements).
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 697–98 (2010).
Id. at 680.
See, e.g., Inazu, supra note 180, at 821–23 (arguing that Martinez undermines both free association
and free exercise rights of groups).
See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (discussing potential limits on
government speech, including Establishment Clause-based limits).
Id.
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trines, as well as perceptions of the relationships between and among different rights. It reveals a constructive process that is perpetual, subject to many
influences, and often ad hoc. Freedom of speech, free exercise, and antiestablishment principles have been and will remain in perpetual conversation
with one another, with important interpretive effects for all three.
III. RIGHTS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND REDUNDANCIES
Studying individual rights in active relation to one another, rather than
as isolated provisions, leads to a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of constitutional rights and constitutional liberty. The study of
Rights Dynamism also demonstrates the importance of avoiding rights subjugation (the dominance of one right over another) and rights redundancy
(treating text as redundancy or surplusage). Notwithstanding their dynamic
and relational nature, however, this study also shows that we need to maintain some conceptual and doctrinal space between constitutional rights. As
the examples discussed in Part II show, constitutional liberty is best facilitated when robust individual guarantees intersect in dynamic and synergistic ways. The observations in this final Part are intended to begin, rather
than conclude, a discussion of Rights Dynamism. In that spirit, the Article
concludes by identifying additional rights and structural relationships that
may be worthy of more systematic study.
A. Situating Rights Relationally
In the legal academy, as well as in broader public discourse, there is a
tendency to separate and balkanize constitutional rights. Law students often study constitutional rights in separate courses. For example, freedom of
expression and freedom of religion are often taught in separate courses.
Even when constitutional guarantees are taught together, instruction tends
to focus on separate doctrines rather than the dynamic intersection between
and among different constitutional rights.
There are of course pedagogical justifications for this rights separatism.
Doctrinally, as well, separation can simplify analysis and facilitate doctrinal
clarity.285 However, Rights Dynamism demonstrates that this approach is
incomplete and problematic.
Constitutional rights are best thought of in relational terms: i.e., as
“cognate,” combined, “kaleidoscopic,” or “stereoscopic.”286 As I have
shown, many rights share historical ties and originating experiences. In the
modern era, they have been joined together through litigation, adjudica-
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See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1130 (arguing against removing doctrinal boundaries altogether).
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tion, academic discourse, and public debate. Many of our most cherished
constitutional rights are actually amalgams and mash-ups—products of active intersections and conversations with neighboring provisions.
Although they are the primary actors engaged in adjudicating intersecting rights claims, courts often ignore or miss these connections. They seek
comfort in doctrinal silos. Doctrinal clarity and precision are important to
constitutional litigation and constitutional remedies. However, the study of
Rights Dynamism shows that rights are often a product of their relationships.
As Jack Balkin has observed:
Rights are not simply a fixed set of protections that the state affords or fails
to afford. Rights are a terrain of struggle in a world of continuous
change—a site of ongoing controversies, a battleground where the shape
and contours of the terrain are remade with each victory. Rights, and particularly fundamental rights, far from being fixed and immovable, are moving targets. They are worth fighting over because the discourse of rights
has power and because that discourse can be reshaped and is reshaped
through intellectual debate and political struggle.287

Rights Dynamism highlights the fact that that part of the “terrain of
struggle” consists of the active intersection of rights and the resulting elaborative effects. An important part of the change we must take into account
relates to the perpetual interaction of rights in a world that is itself changing—socially, politically, and constitutionally.
For example, as Obergefell teaches, due process and equal protection are
not merely, or always, alternative bases for the same constitutional injury.
These rights, like others, can inform, illuminate, and facilitate one another.
Decisions like Obergefell highlight the intersecting and evolutionary nature of
constitutional rights. Through a decades-long intersection, due process and
equal protection produced a new and potentially powerful right to “equal
dignity.”288 Obergefell is no aberration in this regard. The decision simply
makes explicit what is usually a more implicit part of the process by which
the meanings of rights provisions are worked out—through intersection,
combination, and association of rights provisions.
Narrowly construed, constitutional rights are text-based limitations,
with varying degrees of specificity, on the actions of governments. They are
the formal means by which individuals remedy constitutional wrongs. This
often leads litigants, courts, and commentators to look for the best “fit” between the alleged injury and the constitutional text.
Rights Dynamism points toward a deeper and more complex understanding of what rights are and, as importantly, can become. Individual
rights provisions are part of a system of rights protections that can be com-
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bined in ways that lead to new understandings of individual rights. Rights
are like atoms, perpetually in motion. On a larger scale and broader time
horizon, rights guarantees act as tectonic plates that push in various directions—sometimes in tandem, and sometimes in opposition to one another.
It is impossible to fully understand modern conceptions of constitutional
equality without considering the role that freedom of speech (as well as
press and association) has played in constructing the equal protection guarantee. What I have called “expressive equality” both facilitated and
changed First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As well, First Amendment equal access rights under the public forum doctrine and free speech
content neutrality rules significantly influenced modern conceptions of free
exercise of religion. This relationship has also significantly affected understandings of Establishment Clause baselines.
Studying rights relationally, rather than in isolation, informs not only the
scope and substance of individual constitutional guarantees, but also in a
broader sense the nature of constitutional rights and constitutional liberty.
Rights Dynamism shows that constitutional wrongs frequently implicate not
individual textual provisions, but pairings or combinations of rights. When
rights are brought into contact with one another, a dynamic process is set in
motion in which they facilitate, innovate, and transform one another. This
can lead to remedies that are not available when a single right is invoked.
Rights can also come into conflict, or become effectively estranged from one
another. As the examples in Part II show, the evolution of any particular
rights relationship is not a pre-determined course; it is a function of a dynamic
process that includes social, technological, political, and constitutional change.
We ought to study rights relationships systematically, rather than in response to isolated conflicts or developments in discrete areas. A systematic
and relational approach will yield several important benefits. It will clarify
the remedial implications of cumulative and other types of combined rights
claims.289 It will highlight doctrinal ambiguities and inconsistencies in the
treatment of related provisions. For example, First Amendment expressive
and religious freedom doctrines diverge in various respects, including their
treatment of symbolic conduct, funding conditions, and government speech.
Studying these divergences together, side-by-side, may produce valuable insights concerning these rights and their dynamic relation to one another.
Further, comparing different rights pairings can lead to a better understanding of how constitutional rights intersect and converse with one another.
Insofar as the relationship between due process and equality is concerned,
neither provision has exhibited any dominant or distortive tendencies. Freedom of speech and equal protection have also generally managed to intersect
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synergistically in many respects. In contrast, however, the Free Speech
Clause has largely subjugated its textual neighbors, including the Free Exercise Clause. What accounts for this difference? Are some rights more or less
susceptible to subjugation? If so, why? Is the subjugation of the Free Exercise Clause different in kind or degree from the subjugation of the Free
Speech Clause’s other neighbors, the Assembly Clause, the Petition Clause,
and the Press Clause? If so, what accounts for these differences?
Studying rights relationally will also enhance our understanding of the
process of constitutional interpretation and construction. In Rights Dynamism, original or initial rights dynamics are supplemented by intersections
and associations that occur over long periods of time. Substantive changes
are not the result of any grand or purposeful theory of constitutional
change. Rather, they are (again, in part) the product of dynamic interactions influenced by litigation strategies, adjudication, academic commentary, and public discourse. The process of elaboration is diffuse, messy, and
sometimes erratic. Over long periods of time, Rights Dynamism produces
new understandings of constitutional rights. In sum, Rights Dynamism
contributes to the study of how and why rights change by explicitly accounting for how rights interact, associate, and converse with one another.
B. Dynamism and Pluralism
In thinking through relationships between and among constitutional
rights, we should consider how best to leverage negative limits on government. Although constitutional law has many possible goals, let us assume
that the goal with regard to rights is to maximize constitutional liberty. In
order to achieve this goal, two things are necessary: first, individual rights
must retain their independent and distinctive characters and, second, relationships between and among rights must be identified, developed, and
clearly elaborated. Simply put, in order to achieve an effective form of
rights pluralism, we need to foster a Rights Dynamism in which rights can
combine together in facilitative and mutually illuminating ways.290
Recognizing and addressing the relational nature of rights does not entail minimizing or ignoring the differences between them. Even at their
most collaborative, constitutional rights are not an undifferentiated mass of
liberty. When rights intersect, it is imperative that they not merge completely or lose their separate identities.
We must maintain conceptual and doctrinal space between and among
constitutional rights. Textual and doctrinal boundaries can add a degree of
clarity and precision to rights analysis. This is not to suggest that rights
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doctrines are a model of clarity—they aren’t—but rather that analyzing
rights claims is sometimes fostered by channeling them through a particular
framework or set of principles.
More pragmatically, constitutional liberty rests upon a surer footing insofar as claimants can invoke multiple negative limitations on government.
A government forced to defend its actions against a panoply of related but
distinctive rights limitations operates in a more constrained environment.
Rights dynamics that lead to a situation in which one right subordinates or
supplants another confuse constitutional analysis and undermine constitutional liberty.
As importantly, this sort of dynamic cuts off opportunities for developing and understanding the relationships between and among rights. For
instance, the Free Speech Clause has so dominated some of its “expressive”
neighbors—i.e., press, assembly, and petition—that they are now essentially
considered redundant.291 This has effectively reduced four negative limitations to one. Treating four rights as one reduces overall constitutional liberty. By cutting off further exploration of the relationships between distinctive, but related, provisions this interpretation misses important synergies
that might result from their dynamic intersection.
Similarly, as explained in Part II, the Free Exercise Clause now operates under the long shadow of the Free Speech Clause.292 In early interactions, freedom of speech and free exercise provisions offered robust protection for both individual rights, and also contributed to a strong foundation
for constitutional liberty.293 Over-reliance on the Free Speech Clause has
undermined this relationship. Adherents seeking to practice their religious
principles have now been transformed into religious speakers seeking to communicate religious viewpoints. This conception of the free speech-free exercise relationship eliminates critical conceptual and doctrinal space between these overlapping but distinctive rights. It also prevents or
discourages further development of synergistic connections and combinations between them.
To be sure, reliance on free speech doctrines and frameworks has produced equal access to public fora for religious adherents. However, this access has been purchased at a significant price. Public forum and contentneutrality doctrines do not capture the essence of harm to religion from certain kinds of governmental regulation.294 Indeed, they standardize religion
by making it like everything else in the public forum. As one commentator
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has observed, “destroying a religion is much more than stifling a message.
It often involves the destruction of a community and a way of life.”295
Some have argued that particularly after Smith, religious adherents may
be better off under a free speech framework.296 Free speech doctrines provide protection for an array of expressive conduct, and require meaningful
scrutiny of generally applicable laws that incidentally burden expression.297
However, there are significant questions regarding the extent of protection
religious adherents can expect under a free speech regime.298 For example,
treating religion as a viewpoint may make it impossible to provide specific
accommodations to religious adherents.299 Indeed, any singling out of religion arguably would violate free speech content-neutrality rules.300 Public
forum and free speech doctrines may also provide religious adherents less
protection against governmental funding conditions than do the First
Amendment’s religion clauses.301 And of course, a free speech framework
offers no protection at all to religious practices that cannot plausibly be
characterized as expressive, or to expression that originates with or is controlled by government itself.
To some extent, arguments about the relative protections afforded by
the Free Speech Clause to religious practices miss the most important
point. We ought not to be choosing between free expression and free exercise rights when it comes to religious liberty. The possible redundancy of
the Free Exercise Clause would significantly undermine constitutional liberty by preventing the dynamic intersection of expressive and free exercise
rights. Under the current approach, free speech and free exercise principles no longer collaborate and inform one another. By treating the Free
Exercise Clause as redundant text, the Court has effectively short-circuited
its dynamic interaction with the Free Speech Clause.
If rights relationships are to be preserved and their synergies leveraged
in the pursuit of liberty, courts and other interpreters must do a better job
of explaining how rights facilitate and illuminate one another. In this respect, it is not enough to say that two (or three) rights are better than one.302
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Brownstein, supra note 231, at 185.
See, e.g., Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After Boerne, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861–62 (2000) (arguing the Free Speech Clause protects rights of religious
adherents in land use area).
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (applying intermediate level of scrutiny to
laws that incidentally burden expression).
See Brownstein, supra note 231, at 147–64 (examining application of free speech standards to religious zoning, expression, and conduct).
Id. at 169.
Id. at 167–68 (discussing RLUIPA).
See id. at 175–76.
See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1117 (observing that rights combinations “carry the predictable effect
of strengthening negative constitutional limits on government action”).
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Interpreters need to explain and defend rights relationships with more
depth and clarity.
For instance, as the Supreme Court cryptically suggested in Obergefell, due
process and equal protection focus on separate but overlapping concerns.
Each provision adds something distinctive to the constitutional mix. The evil
of discriminatory laws, whether they are anti-sodomy laws, bans on same-sex
marriage, or racially discriminatory enactments, can be fully addressed only
through a combination of due process dignity and equal protection antisubordination concerns.303 Courts need to recognize this overlap, elaborate
relationships between rights more clearly and cogently, and more closely examine how rights operate in tandem to remedy constitutional harms.
Among other things, this kind of analysis would provide a more accurate understanding of how independent constitutional rights are often interpreted—relative to one another, or at intersection points that touch
more than one right at a time.304 Making Rights Dynamism and dynamic
interpretation more explicit would give us a sense of the relative influences
of different rights provisions in terms of case dispositions. For example, it
would better communicate what “work” the due process, equal protection,
freedom of speech, and other provisions are doing in cases where two or
more of these rights are in play.
Of course, actively combining separate rights provisions does not automatically or always produce valuable synergies. As Rights Dynamism
shows, some interactions produce conflicts between rights while others can
limit or even undermine certain rights. In a complex system of overlapping
and intersecting rights, some such tensions are to be expected. Moreover,
we must consider the possibility that the combination of rights provisions
could lead to judicial activism or doctrinal complexities that might not arise
if courts relied on a single rights provision.305 However, the risk that these
potential costs will come to pass ought not to be overstated.306 Rights already operate in relation to one another. Working to define and explicate
rights relationships would not only openly acknowledge this fact, but would
also allow us to openly assess its effects on our system of constitutional rights.
In sum, to achieve a functioning rights pluralism we must both preserve
independent rights provisions and work to facilitate synergistic interactions
between and among them. Constitutional rights ought to be conceived of
303
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as independent but “cognate,” “kaleidoscopic,” and “stereoscopic” provisions that operate within a pluralistic system of rights.307
C. Other Rights Relationships
In terms of the systematic examination of Rights Dynamism, the Article
has focused on three distinctive rights relationships. These pairings are
merely exemplary and illustrative. Other pairings and intersections are also
worthy of examination. In addition, dynamic processes and principles
could also help to explain the relationships between the Constitution’s
structural and individual rights provisions.
We might fruitfully begin by re-considering the suite of rights in the
First Amendment. As Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat has observed, free
speech supremacy has created a situation in which independent rights to
assemble, petition, associate, and publish “might as well not exist.”308
Scholars have sought to resurrect or reclaim these rights. However, they
have tended to do so as freestanding provisions rather than as relational
guarantees. We ought to conceptualize and study these rights not as separate but related, “kaleidoscopic” guarantees, bound together, as Professor
Bhagwat argues, by a concern for broad democratic or other values.309
As a distinctively social right, freedom of speech intersects with a variety
of constitutional rights. In addition to the equality and free exercise guarantees discussed in Part II, freedom of speech intersects with abortion
rights, property rights, privacy rights, Second Amendment rights, the right
to vote, and even the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Scholars could focus useful attention on the relational dynamics
of these rights, and the resulting bi- or multi-directional interpretations.
Moreover, by comparing and contrasting these pairings, we can further our
understanding of individual rights, relational dynamics, and dynamic constitutional interpretation.
The relationship between the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection Clause is receiving increased attention, particularly in the wake of
the Obergefell decision.310 Rights Dynamism and dynamic elaboration can
provide frameworks for examining the progression and construction of this
relationship as it continues to evolve.
Rights Dynamism’s framework and insights could also pay dividends
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See id.; see also Timothy Zick, Recovering the Assembly Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 375, 383–84 (2012)
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with regard to certain criminal procedure rights. Rather than study the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments in isolation, scholars could consider
the dynamic process in which these rights have interacted and influenced
one another. Studying these dynamic intersections might produce better
understandings regarding how litigants, courts, and others have construed
and elaborated these rights over time. Rights Dynamism could also supplement originalist and intratextualist understandings of these rights.
Obergefell was a single but important turning point in the relationship between the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Like all
rights relationships, the relationship between due process and equal protection continues to develop and evolve. For example, in the criminal justice
context, advocates for the poor have invoked due process and, increasingly,
equal protection rights in challenges to bail and other monetary requirements.311 These new invocations could lead to further elaboration of the
relationship between due process and equal protection rights.
Finally, dynamic principles can inform our understanding of how structural constitutional provisions intersect with constitutional rights.312 As Professor Laurence Tribe observes, Obergefell is partly the product of the intersection between LGBT rights and structural principles of federalism.313 He
argues that prior decisions, which rested in part on structural considerations, set in motion a “cascade” in which courts and states began to reconsider a right to “equal dignity.”314 Eventually, as Tribe notes, the Court
“recognized that the time had come to jettison the federalism scaffolding
with which [it] had earlier surrounded that core right.”315 Thus, in the case
of equal dignity and perhaps other rights as well, constitutional rights and
constitutional structure may be intricately connected in ways we have not
yet fully appreciated.
In sum, Rights Dynamism has considerable range in terms of assessing,
explaining, and elaborating the Constitution’s rights and structural provisions.
We can profit by first conceptualizing and then studying constitutional provisions as engaged in dynamic relation and conversation with one another.
CONCLUSION
This Article identifies and describes a process in which various constitu-
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tional rights provisions participate in dynamic intersections that affect constitutional interpretation over time. The process of Rights Dynamism involves many actors and influences—activists, litigants, civic organizations,
the press, scholars, and the people themselves. It typically occurs over the
course of many decades and is perpetual.
Rights Dynamism is not an interpretive theory. It does not purport to
develop or defend normative outcomes. Rather, Rights Dynamism provides a partial description and explanation of how constitutional construction occurs as the result of the dynamic intersection of constitutional rights.
Intratextualists and originalists have identified the deep textual and historical tissues that connect rights to one another. Rights Dynamism recognizes
and respects these connections. However, it focuses on more contemporary
intersections and on the places and contexts in which constitutional meaning is currently being produced. This occurs in judicial pleadings, adjudication, legislative enactments, academic commentary, and public discourse.
A principal thesis of this Article is that constitutional rights are in fact,
and should be conceptualized as, relational constructs. Rights of due process
and equal protection, freedom of speech and equality, and freedom of
speech and free exercise cannot be understood in isolation. These and other rights have all been affected and defined, in significant part, with reference to their dynamic and ongoing relationships with other provisions.
We ought to study, teach, and discuss constitutional rights with careful
attention to their relational character. To that end, the study of Rights
Dynamism could develop into a separate field or discipline. However, the
primary goal of this Article is far more modest. It provides a framework or
perspective for understanding how rights relate to one another and perhaps
also to structural provisions, by focusing on the processes in which constitutional provisions collaborate, illuminate, and sometimes conflict with one
another. By systematically studying this process, we can come to a better
understanding of the nature of constitutional rights and the concept of constitutional liberty.
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